Crossing the Fault Line in Corporate Criminal Law by Sepinwall, Amy J
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Legal Studies and Business Ethics Papers Wharton Faculty Research
2015
Crossing the Fault Line in Corporate Criminal Law
Amy J. Sepinwall
University of Pennsylvania, sepin@wharton.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Administration, Management, and
Operations Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business
Organizations Law Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Finance and Financial Management
Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons,
Legal Studies Commons, and the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers/77
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sepinwall, A. J. (2015). Crossing the Fault Line in Corporate Criminal Law. Journal of Corporation Law, 40 (2), 439-482. Retrieved
from https://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers/77
Crossing the Fault Line in Corporate Criminal Law
Abstract
Why have there been so few prosecutions in the wake of the financial crisis? Official inquiries have found that
rampany mandacity and fraud contributed to the meltdown.2 Yet, if anything, the government has adopted a
"gentler" response to financial wrongdoing in the last five years.3 Why is this?
Disciplines
Banking and Finance Law | Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Business Law, Public
Responsibility, and Ethics | Business Organizations Law | Economic Policy | Finance and Financial
Management | Law | Law and Economics | Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility | Legal Studies |
Organizational Behavior and Theory
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers/77
Crossing the Fault Line in Corporate Criminal Law
Amy J. Sepinwall, J.D., Ph.D.*
The financial crisis left a few individuals responsible for it very rich while its
consequences made millions not responsible for it much poorer. If this involves no crime
then we have failed to define or prosecute crime appropriately. 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Why have there been so few prosecutions in the wake of the financial crisis? Official
inquiries have found that rampant mendacity and fraud contributed to the meltdown. 2 Yet,
if anything, the government has adopted a "gentler" response to financial wrongdoing in
the last five years.3 Why is this?
2. Adam Liptak, Stern Words for Wall Street's Watchdogs, From a Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/us/judge-raises-questions-on-the-paltry-effort-to-prosecute-wall-street-
executives.html?pagewanted=all& r=0; see also Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level
Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.comI/articles/archives/
2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ (asserting that the Great Recession was the product
of intentional wrongdoing, at least in part); cf Neil Irwin, Why Can't the Banking Industry Solve Its Ethics
Problems?, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/upshot/why-cant-the-banking-
industry-solve-its-ethics-problems.html?__r=O ("The financial crisis that nearly brought down the global economy
was triggered in no small part by the aggressive culture and spotty ethics within the world's biggest banks.").
3. Gretchen Morgenson &Louise Story, As Wall St. Polices Itself Prosecutors Use Softer Approach, N.Y.
TIMES (July 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/business/in-shift-federal-prosecutors-are-lenient-as-
companies-break-the-law.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see also Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, In
Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/04/14/business/14prosecute.html?pagewanted=all ("A more aggressive mind-set could have spurred
far more prosecutions."); cf David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
[Vol. 40:2
Crossing the Fault Line in Corporate Criminal Law
We are told that the banks themselves are, in what has now become a depressing
clich6, 4 "too big to fail." 5 But even to the extent that fear of systemic failure (or a general
hostility to holding corporations criminally liable)6 explains the lack of entity-level
prosecutions, there is still the question of why virtually no individual executives at the
wrongdoing entities have met the force of the criminal law.7
(seeking to explain why there has been virtually no judicial response to the financial crisis, even while the other
two branches of government acted to implement robust and far-reaching efforts to shore up and reform our
financial system); Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. &
COM. L. 45, 45 (2006) (reporting that, since the conviction of Arthur Andersen, nearly every major "case of
corporate misconduct has been resolved without" an indictment); Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Is Avoiding Tough
Sanctions for Large Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/
business/sec-is-avoiding-tough-sanctions-for-large-banks.html?pagewanted=al (describing "[a]n analysis by
The New York Times of S.E.C. investigations over the last decade [that] found nearly 350 instances where the
agency has given big Wall Street institutions and other financial companies a pass").
4. It strains credulity to think that giving banks carte blanche to proceed with impunity actually makes the
financial system more, rather than less, stable, but that is a matter for another day.
5. Attorney General Eric Holder stated in testimony before the Senate, "I amconcerned that the size of
some of these institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit
with indications that if we do prosecute-if we do bring a criminal charge-it will have a negative impact on the
national economy, perhaps even the world economy." Transcript: Attorney General Eric Holder on 'Too Big to
Jail', AMER. BANKER (Mar. 6, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_45/
transcript-attomey-general-eric-holder-on-too-big-to-j ail- 1057295-1 .html?zkPrintable= I &nopagination= 1. But
cf Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARv. L. REv. 853, 854-55 (2014)
(arguing that public officials have self-interested incentives to prosecute where success means a large financial
reward (which would cause one to expect enforcement actions against banks) and citing as an example a $25
billion settlement with the nation's leading mortgage-servicing banks); A Mammoth Guilt Trip, THE ECONOMIST
(Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.economist.com/newslbriefing/21614101-corporate-america-finding-it-ever-harder-
stay-right-side-law-mammoth-guilt (arguing that there has been a rise in prosecutions of financial corporations
based on "obscure" charges ensuing in sanctions whose rationale is often "opaque" such that "it is far from
obvious that justice is being done and the public interest is being served").
6. For a sustained defense of corporate criminal liability that seeks to counter this hostility, see generally
Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime,
63 HASTINGS L.J. 411 (2012).
7. As one commentator puts it, "While it seems blindingly obvious that a multitude of misdeeds lay behind
the meltdown, the federal government has not engaged in a single prosecution." Mike LaBossiere, Too Big to
Jail?, TALKING PHILOSOPHY (June 5, 2013), http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?tag=corporate-crime.
LaBossiere's comment is not entirely accurate. The govemment sought to prosecute two Bear Steams employees
for hedge fund fraud. The case was supposed to be an easy one, but the government nonetheless failed to secure
a conviction, and it appears to have grown gun shy as a result. See Marian Wang, Why No Financial Crisis
Prosecutions? Ex-Justice Official Says It's Just too Hard, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 6, 2011, 3:08 PM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/why-no-financial-crisis-prosecutions-official-says-its-just-too-hard
("[A]ccording to a now-departed Justice Department official.., the Justice Department has decided that holding
top Wall Street executives criminally accountable is too difficult a task."). But LaBossiere's general point-that
the government hasn't done as much as it could-is surely right. For example, the government failed to pursue a
criminal case against Angelo Mozilo, CEO at Countrywide, who was alleged to have known he was selling toxic
mortgages to Fannie Mae and Wall Street, for fear that it didn't have enough evidence to win the case. See E.
Scott Reckard, U.S. Drops Criminal Probe of Former Countrywide Chief Angelo Mozilo, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18,
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/201 l/feb/18/business/la-fi-mozilo-20110219; see Jesse Eisinger, Why the SEC
Won't Hunt Big Dogs, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 26, 2011, 11:56 AM), http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/why-
the-sec-wont-hunt-big-dogs (explaining that after it determined that Citigroup had "misled its own customers in
selling an investment it created out of mortgage securities as the housing market was beginning its collapse," the
government went after one-just one-individual at Citigroup, and a low-level banker at that); see also Jason
Ryan, DOJ Will Not Prosecute Goldman Sachs in Financial Crisis Probe, ABC NEWS (Aug. 9, 2012,8:38 PM),
2015]
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The answer lies, I believe, in our unduly constrained understanding of culpability for
crimes in organizational settings like the corporation. Culpability traditionally presupposes
fault and, as John Coffee puts it, most of the heads of the wrongdoing banks are not
"culpable enough by themselves to compare with [Enron's] Ken Lay, Jeff Skilling or the
WorldCom CEO." 8 Judge Jed Rakoff, a federal district court judge in the Southern District
of New York who has earned a reputation for standing up to Wall Street,9 offers a similar
diagnosis, speculating that the Department of Justice (DOJ) may have declined to prosecute
high-level bankers because it believes that the bankers were not, or could not be proven to
have been, at fault. 10
But fault is not everywhere and always the sine qua non of criminal liability. For
example, other nations have well-established legal doctrines that allow for the heads of
banks to incur criminal liability for wrongdoing in which they did not participate. 1 More
sweepingly, fault may matter much less, morally and legally, when it is an organization,
rather than an individual, that commits a crime. One might even contend that where a
corporation has committed a crime, its leader is necessarily a criminal. 12
Deterrence grounds exist for straying from the fault principle. 13 Seeing an executive's
http ://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/201 2/08/doj-will-not-prosecute-goldman-sachs-in-financial-crisis-probe/
(excusing lack of prosecution of Goldman Sachs because "[b]ased on the law and evidence as they exist at this
time, there is not a viable basis to bring a criminal prosecution with respect to Goldman Sachs or its employees").
8. Reckard, supra note 7 (quoting Coffee); cf Floyd Norris, Fury Builds Over Crisis at Banks, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 11, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/business/12norris.html (contrasting Enron, Tyco, and
Worldcom-where executives participated in wrongdoing-with the heads of banks responsible for the financial
crisis-who "did not understand the risks they were taking, and were stunned when the losses materialized"-
and finding that the latter "may have been stupid but stupidity is not a crime").
9. See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld, No More Mr. Nice Guy-Just Ask Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052970203733504577026422455
885502?mod=WSJ MarketsBelowLiveUpdates&mg=reno64wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Fa
rticle%2FSB10001424052970203733504577026422455885502.html%3Fmod%3DWSJMarketsBelowLiveU
pdates (discussing Judge Rakoff and some of his rulings in Wall Street-related cases); Matt Taibbi, Finally a
Judge Stands up to Wall Street, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/finally-a-judge-stands-up-to-wall-street-
201111 10#ixzzliHrUuQzQ (referring to Judge Rakoff as a "hero of our time," at least in part because he refused
to approve a settlement between the SEC and Citigroup for financial fraud in which Citigroup would neither admit
nor deny wrongdoing).
10. See Rakoff, supra note 2 ("[P]roving fraudulent intent on the part of the high-level management of the
banks and companies involved has been difficult.").
11. See, e.g., Blind Justice: Why Have So Few Bankers Gone to Jail for the Financial Crisis?, THE
ECONOMIST (May 4, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21577064-why-have-so-
few-bankers-gone-jail-their-part-crisis-blind-justice ("Germany, Switzerland and Austria, for instance, have an
elastic concept called Untreue, or breach of trust, which is defined as a derogation of duty that causes real damage
to the institution.").
12. I make this claim in a recent Washington Post op-ed. Amy Sepinwall, Criminal Enterprises and
Culpable Leaders, WASH. POST: ON LEADERSHIP (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-
leadership/wp/2013/11/12/criminal-enterprises-and-culpable-leaders/.
13. While the notion of a "fault principle" is a mainstay in torts, it is sometimes invoked in criminal law
theory too. For example, John Gardner defines the fault principle in criminal law as "a principle regulating the
conditions for the imposition of criminal liability" such that "[c]riminal liability should be imposed only for
wrongs that are faultily committed." John Gardner, Wrongs andFaults, 59 REv. METAPHYSICS 95, 109 (2005). I
use the term "fault principle" to denote a commitment to the idea that the defendant must have participated in the
crime with a culpable mental state, and with no justification or excuse, in order for her to be eligible for criminal
liability.
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head roll might well get corporate America's C-suites to clean up their acts. 14 At the same
time, deterrence alone cannot justify criminal liability: We do not punish innocents solely
for the deterrence gains we might thereby reap. This Article seeks to advance and defend
the proposition that corporate executives deserve prosecution and punishment independent
of their participation in their companies' wrongdoing and simply by virtue of their roles.
The implications of such an analysis go far beyond the financial crisis. The failure to
prosecute Wall Street bankers is but one example of the shortcomings of our impoverished
conception of criminal responsibility. The larger theoretical ambition of this Article is to
advance a novel account of shared criminal responsibility, under which one can be
blameworthy even without the traditional hallmarks of culpability or fault. Instead, a
member of a longstanding, institutional group may owe it to her fellows to accept blame,
and sometimes even punishment, for the group's misdeeds, just by virtue of the loyalty
group membership entails. This is especially so in the case of members who are expected
to harbor a particularly strong commitment to the group, like a corporation's executives.
For this reason, I focus on executive responsibility for corporate crime. The theory that
corporate officers should be held responsible for corporate crime can and should reform
our thinking about members' responsibility-both moral and legal-for the transgressions
of other institutional groups too, like the university, the military, or even the nation-state. 
15
The theory of shared responsibility advanced here departs notably from the
foundational conception of culpability in Anglo-American common law, where culpability
presupposes fault, and where fault is understood to arise only where one has made a causal
difference to the occurrence of a wrongful act with a guilty mind. 16 This understanding of
culpability is enshrined in our dominant criminal law doctrines. Thus, for example,
Blackstone proclaimed that "to constitute a crime against human laws, there must be, first,
a vicious will; and secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will."' 17 The
focus on the individual's act and the individual's state of mind reflects an equally
14. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, How to Prevent Oil Spills, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2012),
www.nytimes.com/2012/04/14/opinion/nocera-how-to-prevent-oil-spills.html? r=O (arguing that prison
sentences for corporate executives would encourage corporations to put safety over profits in a way that no other
punishments have); 155 CONG. REC. S2315-16 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2009) (statement of Sen. Kaufnan) (describing
the statement of Neil Barofsky, former federal prosecutor and inspector general of the financial bailout funds,
who "suggested the best way to clean up mortgage fraud is to pursue licensed professionals in the industry, and
make examples of them. 'They have the most to lose, they're the most likely to flip, and they make the best
examples' [Barofsky said]."); cf Irwin, supra note 2 ("[T]he banking industry could be made more ethical if the
right mix of financial penalties for misbehavior were put in place.").
15. Cf Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizen Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes: Blaming Americans for War
Crimes in Iraq, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COLLECTIVE WRONGDOING 231, 235 (Richard Vernon & Tracy Isaacs
eds., 2011) (arguing that citizens share blame for war crimes of their nation-state even if they opposed the war).
16. See, e.g., I JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW §§ 205-06 (9th ed. 1923) ("Prompting
the act, there must be an evil intent .... [A]n act and evil intent must combine to constitute a crime.").
17. IV WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 21. In some
classic statements of law, the mental state element is foregrounded relative to the act element. See, e.g., BISHOP,
supra note 16, at § 287 ("There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind."); Edwin R. Keedy,
Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 81 (1908) ("It is a fundamental principle of
the criminal law, for which no authorities need be cited, that the doer of a criminal act shall not be punished unless
he has a criminal mind."); Williamson v. Norris, [1899] 1 Q. B. 7, 14 ("The general rule of English law is, that
no crime can be committed unless there is mens rea.").
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foundational commitment, viz. that "guilt is personal." 18 The understanding of culpability
that emerges on the traditional view, then, is thoroughgoingly individualist: One is guilty,
and hence punishable, only for what one has done and only if one has done it with a guilty
mind. 19 As such, the notion that an individual may be punished for another's crime is one
that criminal law doctrine accepts rarely and with resignation 20 and that most criminal law
commentators meet with vituperation. 2 1
The traditional view represents the paradigmatic case of blameworthiness-but it is
not the exclusive case. 22 It remains to be determined whether, and if so when, blame may
be assigned under other circumstances. Elsewhere, I have argued for an expansion of
corporate criminal liability for actions committed by a firm. 23 Here, I contend it is
sometimes appropriate to hold a corporate executive individually responsible for the crime
of her corporation, even when she made no causal difference to the crime's commission
and even when she did not harbor a guilty mind.
That a corporate executive is an appropriate target of blame does not itself establish
that her blameworthiness ought to eventuate in criminal liability. But given the moral
condemnation that attends the criminal law, I argue that it is appropriate to prosecute and
18. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 286 (1943) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("It is a fundamental
principle of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that guilt is personal and that it ought not lightly to be imputed to a citizen
who, like the respondent, has no evil intention or consciousness of wrongdoing.").
19. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, 186 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) ("The basic assumption must be that in international law as much as in national
systems, the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal culpability: nobody may be held
criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or in some other way
participated (nulla poena sine culpa).") (footnotes omitted). See generally Amy J. Sepinwall, Failures to Punish:
Command Responsibility in Domestic and International Law, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 251, 252 n.6 (2009) (collecting
citations describing or endorsing the individualist commitment in criminal law).
20. Compare Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284-85 (allowing for the criminal liability of a corporate executive
who neither participated in nor culpably failed to prevent his company's crime, on the ground that such liability
was necessary to protect the public from adulterated medicines), with MODEL PENAL CODE §2.05 cmt. 1 (1962)
(defending the Model Penal Code's retrenchment of strict criminal liability by arguing that "[c]rime does and
should mean condemnation and no court should have to pass that judgment unless it can declare that the
defendant's act was culpable," which, under Section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code means minimally that the
defendant acted with mens rea).
21. See, e.g., Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 79-80 (1933) ("When
the law begins to permit convictions for serious offenses of men who are morally innocent and free from fault..
•, the vitality of the criminal law has been sapped."); Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of
Accomplice Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 447 (2007) ("Vicarious liability is a derivative liability doctrine..
.As such, it has no place in any punishment scheme linking legal liability to moral blameworthiness."); Paul H.
Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1995, at 72-78; Stuart P. Green, Why
It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses,
46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1610 (1997); Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of
Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1392 (2009) (deriding the notion that one person may be punished for
the crime of another by likening it to the primitive doctrine of frankpledge, under which innocent members of a
group could be punished for the wrongful deed of one of their fellows).
22. Cf Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, I CRIM. L. & PHIL. 289, 289 (2007) (arguing that the
requirement that one make a causal difference is merely the paradigmatic, but not the only, case of blameworthy
complicity and contending that one can bear accomplice liability even if one's contribution to the completed crime
made no causal difference because for example, the crime was over-determined).
23. See Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 454 (arguing why individuals within a corporation should be held
criminally liable).
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punish at least some corporate executives, whether or not they bear fault for their
corporation's crime. The argument is bound to perplex criminal law scholars and
practitioners, but it is well-grounded in both legal and ethical theory, as seen in our
practices of praising and rewarding (e.g., through contractual bonuses) group members
independent of their causal contributions to the group's success and our allocation of credit
and blame in group contexts more generally.
Once I have argued that it is morally permissible to prosecute senior bankers for
crimes to which they did not culpably contribute, I next seek to identify a doctrinal hook
for their prosecution. The law provides the government with multiple ways to impose
criminal liability upon the executive who did commit some individual wrong.24
Importantly, however, none of these laws apply to an executive who neither intended nor
knew about his corporation's crime in advance of its commission. And yet, we might ask,
doesn't the existence of a corporate crime necessarily implicate the corporation's
leaders? 25
Following the Article's epigraph, if no existing crime captures the blameworthiness
of those who helmed the ships of the wrongdoing entities, then it is high time to redefine
our criminal law doctrines. This Article's secondary aim is thus to identify a doctrinal hook
for executive liability and to sketch the details of its application to cases of corporate and
financial wrongdoing. To that end, this Article reviews the Responsible Corporate Officer
(RCO) doctrine, which allows for the criminal liability of executives for corporate crimes
they neither participated in nor culpably failed to prevent. 26 While the RCO doctrine has
traditionally been restricted to the health and welfare context, I argue that it compellingly
tracks the understanding of blameworthiness that I advance, and I urge expansion of the
doctrine to corporate crime at large.
The idea that someone might be held criminally liable without fault is not without
precedent in the criminal law, but the formulation I advance is novel. Strict and vicarious
criminal liability are longstanding (though widely reviled and purportedly embarrassing) 27
fixtures in our jurisprudence. The species of criminal liability I have in mind, however, is
from both of these. Strict liability contemplates a defendant who commits the actus reus of
a crime without a culpable mental state. 28 By contrast, the prosecuted executive here need
24. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (giving examples of how individuals were held
criminally liable).
25. Cf The Troubling SAC Case, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2013, 7:35 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323610704578627992699861424 (reacting to the indictment
of the hedge fund, SAC, and the absence of charges against its owner and head, Steven A. Cohen, with the
following rhetorical question: "[c]an a criminal enterprise be run by someone who isn't himself a criminal?").
26. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (setting forth the doctrine).
27. For critiques of strict criminal liability, classic texts include SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND
PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 89-91 (1987); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea andthe Supreme Court,
1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109. For a critique of vicarious criminal liability, see Moore, supra note 21.
28. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 125 (2d ed. 1995) (defining strict
liability offenses as "crimes that, by definition, do not contain a mens rea requirement regarding one or more
elements of the actus reus"). For a survey of different definitions of strict liability, see Kenneth W. Simons, When
Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1079-85 (1997). Cf Douglas Husak,
Strict Liability, Justice and Proportionality, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 152,
160-63 (2010) (distinguishing between formal and substantive strict criminal liability, and arguing that in a case
of formal strict criminal liability, the defendant might well have possessed a culpable mental state; it is just that
the state does not require that this be proven in order to obtain a conviction).
20151
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have performed no criminal act. Vicarious liability contemplates a principal who comes to
bear criminal responsibility for the crime of his agent.29 Here, on the other hand, it is the
principal-i.e., the corporation-that has committed the crime, and the agent-i.e., the
executive-who would be prosecuted and punished. 30 Notwithstanding these differences,
the three doctrines-strict, vicarious, and RCO liability-are spiritual cousins insofar as
each challenges the unduly cramped understanding of responsibility in most of criminal
law. The theoretical advances this Article provides might well be used to defend the
doctrines of strict and vicarious criminal liability, in at least some of their applications.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I argue the public is right to want to see
heads roll on Wall Street because executives share responsibility for their banks'
wrongdoing simply by virtue of their role. The theoretical defense for executive criminal
liability turns then on a concept of shared responsibility. Accordingly, in Part III, I turn to
existing accounts of shared responsibility, and find each of them wanting as grounds for
blaming the faultless executive. In Part IV, I articulate my own theory of shared
responsibility, which aims to elucidate the rationale for holding executives morally
responsible for the crimes of their corporation. With the theoretical foundation for
responsibility in place, I then turn, in Part V, to its legal implementation by describing, and
urging expansion of, the responsible corporate officer doctrine. The move from theory to
doctrine receives further refinement in Part VI, where I propose a series of sanctions that
fit the nature and magnitude of the executive's blameworthiness. Part VII concludes.
II. FINANCIAL WRONGDOING AND UNDISTRIBUTED RESPONSIBILITY
The criminal law response to the spectacular calamities of the financial crisis has been
spectacularly underwhelming. The public has been clamoring for the government to
prosecute individual bankers ever since the financial crisis began, 3 1 and the passage of time
has, if anything, only heightened the hunger for punishment. In the words of one
commentator, "the financial-crisis era . .. saw virtually every major bank and financial
company on Wall Street embroiled in obscene criminal scandals that impoverished millions
and collectively destroyed hundreds of billions, in fact, trillions of dollars of the world's
wealth-and nobody went to jail."'3 2 But we are an evolved society; we do not sacrifice or
jail people-even "reviled" Wall Street bankers3 3-simply to satisfy the public's
bloodlust. We ought to punish banking executives only if they deserve it. I argue that they
29. For a classic overview, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency 1, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 355-62 (1891).
30. Some theorists conceive of the shareholders as a body, rather than the corporation itself, as the principal.
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 313 (1976), available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/joumal/0304405X/3/4. For an incisive critique of that conception, see
generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: How PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMs
INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012).
31. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 8 (describing the "Wall Stree backlash" and its potential to lead to criminal
prosecutions).
32. Matt Taibbi, Why Isn't Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216#ixzz2ccJEQitE.
33. Jonathan Macey, Banks as Bad Guys: How the Banking Industry Went from Respected to Reviled,
FTPREsS.COM (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.ftpress.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2036577 (noting that the public
conceives of bankers as "common criminals").
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do.
The next three Parts are devoted to this argument. Here, I aim to counter the
traditionalist's commitment to individual culpability and motivate a sharing of
responsibility for joint action, especially the joint action of the corporation in a case of
financial wrongdoing. Thus, in Part II.A, I argue that the individualist paradigm fails to
cohere with the collective nature of corporate acts. Part II.B illustrates the problem through
the example of the JP Morgan trading fraud known as the "London Whale."
A. The Tension Between Personal Culpability and Collective Action
Our traditional conception of responsibility contemplates the individual in isolation
from others. To that extent, our traditional conception of responsibility relies on the
notion-some might even say the fiction34-of a fully autonomous self, akin perhaps to
Thomas Hobbes' metaphor of the spontaneously emerging mushroom that owes its creation
and subsequent existence to no one else. 35 Whatever the cogency of this way of proceeding
when it comes to individual action, 36 it defies plausibility when applied to the acts of
groups. For example, consider first the case of an ephemeral group whose members come
together to complete some simple act-e.g., strangers might spontaneously join forces to
free a car that is stuck in a snow bank.37 Once the car has been successfully freed, each of
the individuals who participated in the effort would be licensed in claiming joint ownership
of and credit for the result: 38 "We pushed a car out of a snow bank" is not just true; it is
also a relevant and helpful way of describing what these individuals together did-far more
so than a description in terms of individual contributions would be. (Thus, it would be
exceedingly odd if one of the individuals characterized what he had just done as: "I pushed
the right-back-comer of the car, and so I am responsible for some part of the forward and
leftward displacement of the car"). In short, when we act together, we each come to own
the result of our joint action and not just our individual contribution. 3 9
Moreover, this is especially so where we have organized group action rather than that
of spontaneously formed ephemeral groups like the car pushers above. The case of mass
atrocity provides a useful analogy. Mass atrocity is necessarily carried out by an organized
34. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 321 (1999) ("From
the point of view of justice, the attempt ... to credit specific bits of output to specific bits of input by specific
individuals represents an arbitrary cut in the causal web that in fact makes everyone's productive contribution
dependent on what everyone else is doing. Each worker's capacity to labor depends on a vast array of inputs
produced by other people-food, schooling, parenting and the like.").
35. See, e.g., Peter King, Thomas Hobbes's Children, in THE PHILOSOPHER'S CHILD 69 (1998) (quoting
THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE 8.1 at 160) (explaining Hobbes' theory of the fully autonomous self).
36. I present reasons for doubting the individualist conception of responsibility in Amy J. Sepinwall,
Responsibility for Historical Injustices: Reconceiving the Case for Reparations, 22 J.L. & POL. 183, 193 (2006)
("The individualist's account of responsibility presupposes that we can individuate actions and their effects, and
thereby determine exactly who caused what. But this conception of agency ignores the fact that no one acts in a
vacuum. Others' actions can influence our own, and their effects can combine with ours to form a product that
can no longer be divided into distinct individualized contributions.) (internal footnotes omitted).
37. The example is Avia Pastemak's. Avia Pasternak, Sharing the costs of Political Injustice, 10 POL., PHIL.
& ECON. 188, 196-97 (2012).
38. Christopher Kutz refers to this as a form of "inclusive authorship." CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY:
ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 107 (2000).
39. Id.
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group whose members commit individual acts of assault, killing, or destruction against
another, identifiable group with the intention of causing this other group at least pain and
suffering (and sometimes obliteration). The defining characteristic of mass atrocity is its
systematic, organized aspect. A single individual can intentionally kill as many people as
might be targeted in a case of mass atrocity. Thus, for example, someone might
intentionally detonate a bomb that killed thousands. Still, the bomber's act would count as
a mass murder but not a mass atrocity. By definition, mass atrocities are the acts of groups,
not individuals. 40
For this reason, assigning responsibility for mass atrocities taxes the traditional,
individualist conception of criminal liability. Thus, George Fletcher and Mark Drumbl
have each argued that "the first principle of domestic criminal law-personal culpability-
may have to be modified or abandoned, if international law is ever to successfully 'adapt[
]... the paradigm of individual guilt to the cauldron of collective violence' epitomized by
mass atrocity."' 4 1 So too our domestic criminal law system must acknowledge and
accommodate the unique features of the collective acts undertaken by corporations, as
many theorists have realized. 42
More specifically, in the face of corporate action, three modes of assigning
responsibility, each aligning itself with a different ontological view of the corporation,
present themselves.4 3 Reductionists, who view the corporation as a nexus of contracts,
believe that the corporation's acts are entirely reducible, and hence attributable, to the
individuals who constitute it (or some subset thereof).44 This is a strictly individualist
approach to corporate action, and it presumes the possibility of individuating contributions
I suggested were implausible above.
A second approach proceeds from a view of the corporation as a real entity, capable
40. See, e.g., Mass Atrocities, CIVIL-MILITARY FUsION CENTRE (May 26, 2011),
https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/libya/Documents/Human%20Rights/Mass%20atrocities.pdf (defining a mass
atrocity as "the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-
combatants").
41. Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1751, 1768 (2005) (quoting Mark A. Drumbl, Pluralizing International Criminal Justice, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1295, 1309 (2005), and citing id. and George P. Fletcher, Collective Guilt and Collective Punishment, 5
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 163, 168-69, 173-74 (2004)); see also Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and
Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 539, 542 (2005) (detailing that "a
number of selected guilty individual's squarely are to be blamed for systemic levels of violence"); George P.
Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, Ill YALE L.J.
1499, 1504 (2002) (analyzing whether it is acceptable to assign guilt to actors collectively and countries
collectively).
42. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of collective responsibility as
well as individual responsibility in corporate criminal liability).
43. For general overviews of differing theories about the corporate form, see generally David Millon, New
Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993), and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 Wisc. L.
REV. 999 (2010).
44. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 323 (1996)
(describing the different analysis of imposing crimes on third parties in corporations where there exists a myriad
of contractual relationships filled with individuals joining together for a mutual economic benefit); V.S. Khanna,
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1477-78 (1996)
(comparing the "costs and benefits of corporate criminal liability" with the costs and benefits of other liability).
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of bearing responsibility for its acts in its own right. 45 I have elsewhere sought to contest
the notion of corporate (or collective) responsibility, 46 but will not do so here because even
if corporate responsibility proves correct, it does not occlude the third approach, which I
seek to elucidate and defend in this Article.
This third approach is compatible with both real and fiction views of the corporation,
and it holds that members of the corporation share responsibility for its acts. This approach
can operate alongside the notion of corporate responsibility for it might be the case that
both the corporation and its members bear responsibility for the act. The set of members
who may be assigned responsibility and the magnitude and ground of the assignment vary
among the different theories of shared responsibility, and I will survey this terrain in the
next Part. For now, I shall seek to motivate further the excursion into accounts of shared
responsibility by arguing that individualism is especially implausible for wrongdoing in
the financial crisis.
B. Corporate and Financial Wrongdoing
To make matters concrete, consider the recently announced prosecutions of two
JPMorgan traders in the wake of "the London Whale," billed as "one of Wall Street's
biggest trading blunders of the past few years." 47 The two traders are charged with having
falsified records in the first half of 2012 in order to cover up losses resulting from a
problematically risky bet that the bank made.4 8 Suppose now that the DOJ succeeds in
securing convictions against these two bankers. The allegedly criminal acts in which they
participated led to $6.2 billion in losses for JPMorgan. Moreover, it is believed that many
people at JPMorgan worked together to hide these losses from investors and regulators, 4 9
45. See, e.g, PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSBILITY (1984); cf Philip Pettit,
Responsibility Incorporated, 117 ETHICS 171, 177 (2007) (punting on the question of the corporation's
ontological status but nonetheless holding that it can bear responsibility in its own right). Here, too, there is an
analogous approach in international criminal law. See, e.g., LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A
NORMATIVE ACCOUNT 246-49 (2005) (advocating collective responsibility as a supplement to individual
responsibility in "situations of group-based harm, [where] many members of the society may have chosen to play
a role in the climate that has been instrumental in nurturing the harmful conduct"); LARRY MAY, WAR CRIMES
AND JUST WAR 247-56 (2007) (offering a qualified defense of joint criminal enterprise as a kind of collective
responsibility where the responsibility of each member turns on his having an intention to participate in the
collective injury); Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1481, 1482 (2009) ("[1]mposing criminal liability on corporations makes sense, because corporations are
not, fundamentally, fictional entities. Rather, they are very real and enormously powerful actors whose conduct
often causes very significant harm both to individuals and to society as a whole.").
46. See generally Sepinwall, supra note 6.
47. Agustino Fontevecchia, London Whale And Ina Drew Off The Hook As Two Ex-JPMorgan Traders
Face Criminal Charges, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2013, 1:07 PM),
http ://www.forbes.corn/sites/afontevecchia/201 3/08/1 4/london-whale-and-ina-drew-off-the-hook-as-two-e x-
jpmorgan-traders-face-criminal-charges/.
48. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, U.S. Puts a Helpful Face on Its Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug.
14, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/14/u-s-puts-a-helpful-face-on-its-fraud-
case/?ref-morganjpchaseandcompany (discussing the actions of employees involved in the risky trading practices
that cost JPMorgan Chase to lose more than $6 billion).
49. See, e.g., Stephen Gandel, Why JPMorgan's 'London Whale' Was Set Free, CNNMONEY.COM (Aug.
14, 2013 3:31 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/08/14/jpmorgans-london-whale-free/ (explaining the
role of JPMorgan's executives aiding the continuance of the accused traders' risky behavior).
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and an independent report concluded that lax controls and an aggressive profit-seeking
culture facilitated the fraud.50 On this understanding of the circumstances, it would be a
mistake to view the faulty record-keeping as the rogue act of a couple of traders with intent
to conceal their misplaced bets from the rest of the bank. Instead, we should impute the
traders' activities to the bank as a whole.5 1
But the government's response to the bank itself has been half-hearted. The
government chose to respond to JPMorgan through a civil, rather than a criminal, suit.
While the SEC made a show of extracting a confession of wrongdoing from the bank, the
confession states not that the bank authorized or promoted the fraud but instead that it
merely failed to adequately supervise the fraudsters. 52 Jamie Dimon, the bank's
longstanding and much lauded CEO,5 3 not only escaped responsibility but ended the year
with a 74% pay raise, bringing his salary to $20 million.54 Of course, there may well be
political or prudential reasons for foregoing a harsher response. But we should also
recognize that a more sweeping response would be disfavored regardless, given our
criminal law doctrines' rigid and narrow focus on individual culpability.
The problem, in greater detail, is this: If we insist on an individualist assignment of
responsibility, we will have to resign ourselves to prosecuting those who actively
participated in, or at best instigated or knowingly tolerated, the fraud. But there is a
disturbing disconnect between this set of individual prosecutions and a crime that appears
to have resulted from a pervasive culture of profit seeking so aggressive that it motivated,
and perhaps even mandated, efforts to mislead investors and regulators. 5 5 Thus, a legal
50. REPORT OF JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE REGARDING 2012 CIO LOSSES 7
(2013), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2272984969xOx628656/4cb574aO-Obf5-4728-
9582-625e4519b5ab/Task Force Report.pdf (presenting "the Task Force's view that responsibility for the flaws
that allowed the losses to occur lies primarily with CIO management but also with senior Firm management").
See also Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Charges Against 2 Traders Fault JPMorgan for Lack of
Oversight, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 14, 2013, 9:56 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/14/government-charges-two-former-jpmorgan
employees/?ref-morganjpchaseandcompany ("While just two former London traders ... were criminally charged
... the cases intensify the scrutiny of the banks executives ... where lax controls and the pressure for profits
aggravated the problem."); Fontevecchia, supra note 47 (noting that supervisors for the more senior of the two
defendants were "breathing down his neck" in an effort to ensure he would ensure his underlings masked the
losses).
51. Cf Beale, supra note 45, at 1484 (arguing that bribery at the Siemens corporation was so widespread
that "[t]here is nothing wrong with recognizing that it was Siemens, not simply some of its officers or employees,
who should be held legally accountable. U.S. investigators found that the use of bribes and kickbacks were not
anomalies, but the corporation's standard operating procedure and part of its business strategy").
52. Press Release, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Files and Settles Charges
Against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., for Violating Prohibition on Manipulative Conduct In Connection with
"London Whale" Swaps Trades (Oct. 16, 2013), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6737-13.
53. For example, in her account of the dynamics precipitating the financial meltdown, Gillian Tett portrays
Dimon as a visionary and honorable white knight amid a sea of ruthless and brutish counterparts. See generally
GILLIAN TETr, FOOL'S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J. P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED
BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE (2009) (detailing the career and good-standing
reputation of JPMorgan's Chief Executive Officer, Jamie Dimon).
54. Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann S. Lublin, Dimon Gets Raise After Rough Year, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702304856504579340313243025826?mod=djemjiewr F
N domainid.
55. Cf Beale, supra note 45, at 1484 ("Because of their size, complexity, and control of vast resources,
corporations have the ability to engage in misconduct that dwarfs that which could be accomplished by
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response limited to a handful of individual prosecutions would leave us with a surfeit of
wrongdoing for which no one would be accountable. Call this the problem of undistributed
responsibility. 56
Of course, that there is some justice left to mete out does not yet establish that we are
licensed in distributing it to senior executives in the bank by indicting them for the bank's
crime. But it does provide a rationale for inquiring seriously into whether we might be.
This undistributed responsibility should prompt us to see whether we can arrive at
compelling reasons for thinking that senior bankers, who did not culpably contribute to
their bank's crime, nonetheless deserve to be prosecuted. I turn now to existing theories of
shared responsibility to see whether any might fit the bill.
III. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
Individuals can share responsibility in the sense that the responsibility assignment is
to be allocated between them, or they can share responsibility in the sense that the
responsibility assignment is common among them. This second sense is analogous to the
use of "sharing" when one refers to a shared value, a shared point of view, a shared way of
life, and so on, and it is this sense of sharing that shall occupy us here. The claim in need
of defense is that executives may all bear some amount of responsibility for their
corporation's crime, independent of the causal role that any of them played. For now, I
leave to one side the question of whether, and if so how, the magnitude of responsibility
varies among them. 57
Arguably, there are many ways in which members may come to share responsibility
for an act of their group. Some accounts of shared responsibility presuppose that each
member proximately caused the act for which responsibility is to be assigned. For instance,
Joel Feinberg describes a case exemplifying "group fault distributable to each member" 58
where a conspiracy to commit a bank robbery and the robbery's success is due to each of
the members, who variously function as perpetrators, abettors, inciters, or protectors.5 9 The
accounts examined in this Part are broader in scope in that they do not require that members
proximately cause the group transgression. Since the account I advance in the next Part
seeks to assign responsibility for a corporate act to officers independent of their
participation, I consider here only those accounts that are (at least relatively) insensitive to
the extent of members' participation.
Why should executives share responsibility for a crime in which they have not
participated? The accounts of shared responsibility I interrogate here locate the ground of
shared responsibility in the benefits of membership; the structure or culture of the
organizations in which members operate; or the sharing of intentions that group activity
requires.60 I consider each in turn.
individuals.").
56. I am grateful to Bill Laufer for suggesting this term.
57. This question is discussed in Part IV, where I articulate the factors in virtue of which two executives
who did not participate in the corporate crime might nonetheless bear differing amounts of responsibility for that
crime.
58. Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. PHIL. 674, 684 (1968).
59. Id.
60. Consent has been proffered as a distinct ground of shared responsibility. R.S. Downie, Responsibility
and Social Roles, in INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: MASSACRE AT My LAI 63, 70 (Peter A.
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A. Benefits-Based Accounts of Shared Responsibility
Those who ground a sharing of responsibility in the benefits membership accords
typically have one of two things in mind-the material benefits arising from a cooperative
endeavor, or the positive effects membership confers upon one's sense of self. In the case
of the former, responsibility is alleged to flow reciprocally from the material benefits
received.6 1 Thus, for example, Eric Posner and Adrien Vermeule argue that "[p]eople enter
relationships in order to obtain the benefits of collective action; in the process they become
blameworthy for the harms that occur as a result of collective action." 62 Similarly,
Christopher Kutz argues that "[tihe possibility of expanding our powers (or rewards)
through cooperation entails the risk that the resulting act will not align with our moral
interests," 63 and that we will thereby come to bear accountability for the collective act.64
Perhaps most sweepingly, Hannah Arendt claimed that sharing responsibility is the "price
we pay" for living in human community. 65 For the second kind of benefit, responsibility
hinges on the member's pride in the group's glories, which is held to require, as a matter
of psychological consistency, shame in the face of the group's transgressions. 6 6
The general problem with relying upon the benefits of group membership to ground
shared responsibility is that benefits do not connect members to the group transgression in
the right way. First, as I have argued elsewhere, non-members may benefit from the group
in just the way that members do, so benefits alone cannot do the work of grounding shared
responsibility. 67 Further, the rationale for responsibility on a benefits-based account
contemplates a species of responsibility distinct from blameworthiness: For benefits-based
theorists, responsibility just "comes with the territory" of membership, so to speak. In this
French ed., 1972). 1 have elsewhere argued that the fact that an individual has consented to be blamed and
punished for a wrong does not entail that we are justified in blaming and punishing her, just as the fact that some
individual has offered to die for our sins does not entail that we are justified in killing her. Amy J. Sepinwall,
Responsible Shares and Shared Responsibility: In Defense of Responsible Corporate Officer Liability, 2014
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 371, 395-96 (2014).
61. Janna Thompson also offers a defense of shared responsibility that relies upon material benefits, but
her account has a kind of pay-it-forward, rather than pay-it-back, rationale. Janna Thompson, Collective
Responsibility for Historic Injustices, 30 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 154, 154 (2006).
62. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 689, 703 (2003). In his defense of collective responsibility, Larry May adverts, but only in
passing, to the concrete benefits group membership affords. LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS:
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED HARM, AND CORPORATE RIGHTS 77 (1987). As such, it is not clear
that the benefits rationale is intended to carry much weight in his account.
63. KUTZ, supra note 38.
64. See, e.g., id. at 157 (alluding to how an engineer is accountable for mine sales because of his intentional
participation in a collective project).
65. Hannah Arendt, Collective Responsibility, in AMOR MUNDI 50 (James Bemhauer ed., 1987); see also
Cassie Striblen, Guilt, Shame and Shared Responsibility, 38 J. SOC. PHIL. 469, 474 (2007) (describing Arendt's
view as having two requirements, "I must be held responsible for something I have not done, and the reasons for
my responsibility must be my membership in a group ... ").
66. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self 105 HARv. L. REV. 959, 986-
87 (1992); MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 129 (2000) (describing "membership
remorse," the remorse felt by group members just in virtue of their membership); cf Posner & Vermeule, supra
note 62, at 710 (describing a similar phenomenon as "moral taint").
67. Cf Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsibility for Historical Injustices: Reconceiving the Case for Reparations,
22 J.L. & POL. 183, 200 (2008) (detailing how non-members of a group can experience a psychological
connection that is just as strong as the one members feel).
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way, members are made to pay for group transgressions for just the same reasons that they
are made to pay for other group expenses incurred through no fault of their own, or at no
benefit to themselves. Thus, all Americans contributed tax dollars for reparations payments
made in 1988 to Japanese-Americans interned in World War I, even though many of the
taxpayers were not even alive at the time of the internment, just as all residents of a school
district pay property taxes to fund the local public schools, whether or not they have school-
age children. These mandated contributions are justified simply in virtue of our
membership in the relevant polity. Redress payments have no special moral meaning on a
benefits-based account. As such, these accounts would have us understand our
contributions to efforts to rectify our group's wrong as demurrals, not acknowledgments,
of blame-paying up is just what we do qua members, not just what we ought to do to
repair our group's, and hence our own, wrong. In this way, benefits-based accounts
contemplate only a forward-looking kind of shared responsibility and not the backward-
looking kind that is the hallmark of blameworthiness. 6 8 These accounts are not, then, true
rivals to the one I will go on to advance.
B. Organization-Based Accounts of Shared Responsibility
A second strand of theory seeks to ground shared responsibility for corporate crime
in the corporation's organizational structure or culture, 69 one or both of which is alleged
to have contributed to the crime's commission. Insofar as executives bear responsibility
for the corporation's structure or culture, they bear responsibility for any crimes these
elements produce. Or so the argument would go.
It is undoubtedly true that a corporation's culture can facilitate or promote
wrongdoing. Consider, for example, the 2010 Massey Energy mine explosion that caused
29 deaths. 70 Each of four separate investigations concluded that the tragedy was
attributable to the company's culture that privileged productivity over safety. 7 1 Yet,
notwithstanding the increasing acceptance of organizational bases for criminal liability, 72
attempts to ground corporate officers' responsibility in the structures or cultures of their
68. For more on the distinction between forward- and backward-looking conceptions of responsibility, see,
e.g., Annette C. Baier, How Can Individualists Share Responsibility?, 21 POL. THEORY 228, 243 (1993)
(describing how a forward-looking division of responsibility is usually accompanied by a similar backward-
looking responsibility).
69. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability,
75 MtNN. L. REv. 1095, 1121-46 (1991); cf AUSTL. MODEL CRIMINAL CODE §§ 501.2, 501.3.1 (2009) (allowing
for corporate prosecutions where the corporate culture has contributed to the crime); LARRY MAY, SHARING
REsPONsIBiLITY 42-52, 73-86 (1992) (assigning shared responsibility for racist hate crimes to all those who are
racist, insofar as all "causally contribut[e] to a climate that influences others to cause harm").
70. Peter Galuszka, How Many Coal Miner Deaths Does It Take To Pass Safety Regulations?, SLATE (Nov.
14, 2012, 3:31 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health-and-science/coalU2012/l /minedisaster westvirginia no new safetyre
gulations after massey_s_upper.html.
71. Howard Berkes, Former Massey CEO Accused of Conspiracy in Court Hearing, NPR: THE TWO WAY
(Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/02/28/173178951/former-massey-ceo-accused-of-
conspiracy-in-court-hearing.
72. See, e.g., Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olaz~bal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 81, 165 (discussing "a clear societal mandate to seek out and eliminate corporate wrongdoing at
every level").
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organizations remains problematic.
More specifically, there is a concern about under-inclusiveness in holding executives
responsible for the structure or culture of the corporation that committed a crime.
Bureaucratization, a pervasive feature of corporate life, permits culpable ignorance. 73
Many corporations share similarly nefarious cultures. Thus, for example, at the turn of the
millennium, a "nothing-but-profits-matter" culture infected not just WorldCom and
Enron74 but many other American corporations as well.75 Yet, only some of these
corporations engaged in criminal wrongdoing as a result. Appeals to a corporation's
structure or culture fail to elucidate why it is solely the executives in the corporation that
act illegally who bear responsibility for an illegal act, rather than all those executives who
operate within the same bureaucratic structures that facilitated the corporation's crime, or
all those executives who set an aggressive, competitive tone for their employees.
Further, there is a possible concern about over-inclusiveness too: Suppose that a
particular corporation promotes an especially hard-hitting attitude among its sales
employees but makes it clear that they should nonetheless act within existing legal
constraints, and it implements (not merely pretextual) oversight devices to ensure
compliance with the law. Nonetheless, given the strong incentives to perform well, some
employees break the law to augment sales-indeed, they feel driven to do so by the no-
holds-barred culture they sense around them. At the same time, other employees subject to
the same pressures nonetheless resist the temptation to act illegally. So the company culture
was not itself sufficient to cause these legal violations. If it were, all who were subjected
to this company's culture would have broken the law. Instead, perhaps the offending
employees were less talented than their upstanding colleagues and so needed to adopt
illegal methods to compete, or perhaps their economic circumstances motivated the illegal
acts, or perhaps they labored under weakness of will, or so on and so forth. But surely
executives in the corporation are not responsible for the factors that prompted some
employees to cross the line, or at least not any more responsible for these factors than
anyone else. Again, then, why hold these executives responsible for the illegal acts that the
culture may have encouraged but did not compel?
The foregoing is not intended to suggest that a group's structure or culture is irrelevant
to an understanding of the nature of the executive's responsibility. It is just that these
73. David Luban et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L. Rev. 2348, 2356-60
(1992).
74. See DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC. 18-19 (Mar. 31, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723527/000093176303001862/dex991 .htm (summarizing investigation
into cause of WorldCom's fraud); Abril & OlazAbal, supra note 72, at 164 (quoting a plaintiff in In re Enron
Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 633 (S.D. Tex. 2002), who described "Enron's
'corporate culture' as characterized by 'a fixation on the price of Enron stock' and on pushing that price ever
higher,"' and went on to state that "many Enron employees believe, 'We're such a crooked company."').
75. See Bernie Sanders, Greed, Greed, and More Greed, SANDERS SCOOP NEWSLETTER (Summer 2002),
available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Political/GreedMoreGreedSanders.html (highlighting that
more than 1000 companies have been forced to correct financial statements in the past five years); cf Haskell
Fain, Some Moral Infirmities of Justice, in INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: MASSACRE AT MY
LAI 17, 33 (Peter French ed., 1972) (describing a Harvard poll, conducted shortly after the My Lai massacre, that
found that over half of the respondents, representing a cross-section of Americans at the time, would have shot
the women, children and elderly of that village had they been ordered to do so).
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features are epiphenomenal-to the extent that the executive reinforces this culture, that is
a sign of, or evidence that supports his commitment to the corporation, which is what
grounds his responsibility, as we shall see in the next Part. First, though, we should examine
one other strand in the shared responsibility literature.
C. Shared Intention Accounts of Shared Responsibility
There has been a steady migration of accounts of shared intention into legal
scholarship, as theorists try to make sense of jurisprudence, judging, and joint action by
reference to these accounts.7 6 A shared intention is, roughly, (a) an intention that two or
more individuals perform some act together, which entails (b) that each intend to do her
part to facilitate fulfillment of that act, in particular by (c) intending to coordinate her part
with the others, where (a)-(c) are common knowledge to each of the individuals who share
the intention. 77 Those who invoke shared intentions as a basis of shared responsibility
usually have a discrete act in mind, with relatively few participants. 78 Holding an accessory
to a crime responsible for that crime is a typical application of such accounts: 79 For
instance, the driver of the get-away car in a bank robbery, though he did not himself commit
the robbery, will nonetheless be held responsible for it if he intended his driving of the get-
away car to contribute to the robbery. 80 The driver shared an intention to commit the
robbery, which entailed an intention to do his part in the completion of the robbery (in his
case, driving the get-away car) and an intention to coordinate his activities with those of
his fellow felons (e.g., by driving the car around to the back of the bank if the robbers
decided to change their escape route at the last minute). Moreover, his intention to do his
part and coordinate his contribution with the others' is common knowledge to all of them.
The acts that form the subject of this Article are different from the example just
76. See generally SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011) (referencing shared intentions as related to
analytical jurisprudence); see generally Facundo M. Alonso, Shared Intentions, Reliance, and Interpersonal
Obligations, 119 ETHICS 444 (2009) (discussing shared intention theory); see generally Jens David Ohlin, Joint
Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 693 (2011) (discussing shared intention theory
within the context of international crimes).
77. This is a sketch of the notion of a shared intention that corresponds, at least roughly, with the sometimes
highly technical elucidation of the nature of a joint intention. For these more careful and elaborate analyses, see,
for example, MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION (1999), especially essays 5-8, as well as KUTZ, supra
note 38, at 66-112; Raimo Tuomela, Joint Intention, We-Mode and 1-Mode, 30 MIDWEST STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY 35 (2006); Brook Jenkins Sadler, Shared Intentions and Shared Responsibility, 30 MIDWEST
STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 115 (2006).
78. Indeed, even where he explicitly attempts to draw out the implications for responsibility of his theory
of shared intention, Michael Bratman, who might be called the father of the shared intention literature,
contemplates only small institutional groups, such as a university admissions committee, or collections of
individuals who do not constitute a group at all, such as acquaintances who intend to paint a house together. See
generally Michael E. Bratman, Dynamics of Sociality, 30 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 1 (2006).
79. See, e.g., Michael McKenna, Collective Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory, 30 MIDWEST
STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 16, 16-17 (2006) (finding moral responsibility in a collective that has the shared
intention of helping a third party evade police); cf Dan-Cohen, supra note 66, at 986-87 (grounding the get-away
driver's responsibility in his identification with the crime rather than his sharing an intention that it be done).
80. Christopher Kutz offers this example as paradigmatic of the way a shared intention entails
accountability for each of the parties to it, though his account is intended to cover cases where the shared intention
is much broader in scope, and permits much flexibility in how the parties to it may understand and execute their
parts in fulfilling it, as we shall see in what follows. KuTz, supra note 38, at 228-29.
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described insofar as the Article is concerned with assigning responsibility for financial
crimes to corporate executives where at least some of these executives harbored no
intention that the crime be committed; some may even have been ignorant of the crime's
occurrence. The notion of a shared intention, at least without further qualification, is not
likely to be helpful in establishing the responsibility of corporate executives in such
cases. 81 For that reason, I do not address the general cogency of the notion of shared
intentions here.
There is, however, one set of accounts of shared intentions that warrants attention.
Some theorists have argued that we should understand the project that unites members of
a collective quite broadly. These theorists contend that each member need not intend the
transgression in question so long as it is plausible to construe the transgression as a
reasonable way for one member to carry out the larger project that all intend for the group
to complete. 82
Christopher Kutz offers what is perhaps the most elegant account linking shared
intentions to shared responsibility, but his account yields both under- and over-inclusive
assignments of responsibility. According to Kutz, "a set of individuals can jointly
intentionally G even though. some, and perhaps all, do not intend that G be realized, or do
not even intend to contribute to G, but only know their actions are likely to contribute to
its occurrence." 83 Kutz's conception of a collective act is expansive and so it finds
intentional participation not just among those who intend that the collective act be achieved
but also among "cognitively vague, alienated or dyspeptic agents." 84 All of these agents
bear at least some accountability for the collective act, on Kutz's account, since
"[i]ntentional participation provides a special basis for ascribing individual members'
actions to the group as a whole, and to the group members individually." 85 Thus, "the
actions of each and the actions of all are the actions of the collective." 86
Kutz's account is remarkably sweeping because it allows action stemming from any
subsidiary intention that can rationally be related to the shared goal to redound to the group
as a whole and hence to its members. As he says: "When we act together, we are each
accountable for what we all do, because we are each authors of our collective act."' 87 The
ground for such widespread accountability is for Kutz the way in which our shared goals
manifest our will: "We are properly held accountable for the actions of groups (and of
individual group members) in which we participate, because these actions represent our
own conception of our agency and our projects .. .[Group members] manifest their
attitudes through one another's actions." 8 8 Kutz even offers a "slogan" to capture his thesis
pithily: "No participation without implication." 89
There are two problems with the structure of accountability on Kutz's account, both
81. Cf Paul Sheehy, Holding Them Responsible, 30 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOsOPHY 74, 75-76 (2006)
(noting the implausibility of extending the notion of shared intentions to large, complex groups).
82. See generally KUTZ, supra note 38 (arguing that cases of collective action often involve individuals
who are isolated from the group's intended result); Sadler, supra note 77.
83. KuTz, supra note 38, at 103.
84. Id. at 102.
85. Id. at 138.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 138-46 (defending the claim that participation brings about responsibility).
88. KUTZ, supra note 38, at 140-41.
89. Id. at 114.
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relating to the purported teleological connections between the shared goal and the acts it is
alleged to explain. First, the over-arching goal shared by group members may be so grand
or diffuse that virtually any act its members pursue can plausibly be said to be in the service
of the shared goal. Consider, for example, that both supporters and opponents of the Nazi
regime might have shared the goal of glorifying the Fatherland. The problem is that the
Fatherland's glorification did not demand the Nazi program of mass genocide. As such, it
is a stretch to say that Germans who opposed the Nazi regime nonetheless provided
teleological warrant for the Nazis' systematic extermination and purification efforts. This
is especially so in the case of those Germans who stayed precisely in order to thwart Nazi
activities. And yet, Kutz's theory would hold accountable for the Holocaust both Nazis and
German resistance fighters who opposed the Nazi regime given, again, that both shared the
larger ambition of seeking to have Germany flourish.
If appeal to the shared goal sometimes results in too broad an ascription of
responsibility, it also often fails to cast responsibility broadly enough. Kutz's account
presupposes that groups can be characterized by a unity of purpose. Yet it is a fact, and
perhaps even a virtue, of groups that members may diverge in their sense of what the group
is about. 90 Kutz contends that there must be some region of overlap between members'
conceptions of the purpose or identity of the group if there is to be a coherent group at all. 9 1
But the region of overlap may well be dwarfed by the great swaths of imaginative terrain
occupied by those who embrace a vision of the group that their fellow members would
eschew. 92 The nineteenth-century American who repudiated the nation's "manifest
destiny" might well still bear responsibility for the unjust annexation of Native American
lands, just as the twentieth-century American who refused to recognize the nation's
exploratory imperative might well still bear responsibility for the nation's extravagant and
environmentally damaging space program. 93
In sum, Kutz's account is inclined to mislead us, at least in the case of large groups
90. Consider, for example, the following exchange from the film 2 Days in Paris, as reconstructed in The
New Republic, in which the film's protagonist expresses the view that Democrats and Republicans essentially
belong to two different nations: "Having just arrived in Paris, Jack quickly reduces the line at the train-station cab
stand by sending a pack of tourists from the American heartland off with fake walking directions to the Louvre.
'But aren't they your compatriots?' Marion asks. 'My compatriots?' Jack replies, irritably. 'They voted for
Bush,"' and, with that, he rests his case. Christopher Orr, French Roast, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2007),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/french-roast.
91. KUTZ, supra note 38, at 103.
92. See id. at 163-64 (describing how Kutz compellingly addresses the case in which a group member fails,
as a result of false consciousness, to view her work as connected to a shared goal that she disavows). The problem
I am considering here, however, arises where members genuinely diverge as to the content of the shared goal.
93. See, e.g., Robert R. Schmucker & Klaus R. Wagner, Do Shuttle Exhaust Gases Damage the Ozone
Layer? The Environmental Burden Imposed by Space Travel, 27 ASTRONAUTIK 105 (1990); Ker Than, Nobel
Laureate Disses Manned Spaceflight: Particle Physicist Calls International Space Station an 'Orbital Turkey,'
NBCNEWS.COM (Sept. 19, 2007, 11:39 AM), www.msnbc.com/id/20869407/ (criticizing the manned space
program for its environmental impact and cost, as well as its lack of scientific usefulness). If the group actively
promoted diversity in its members' conceptions of the shared goal precisely in order to confer immunity on some
of them for the acts others undertook on behalf of the group, we might then have a compelling ground for holding
all responsible. Cf Luban et al., supra note 73, at 2348 (grounding responsibility of ignorant members of a
bureaucracy in the compartmentalization of functions and information whose very aim it is to shelter those
members). The responsibility assignment would then be justified in virtue of the structure or strategy facilitating
diversity, not the shared goal itself.
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with grand and dynamic raisons d'Otre. This is because the teleological connection between
shared goal and subsidiary intention provides either an over-inclusive ground of
responsibility-as in the case of assigning responsibility for the Holocaust to those who
did not support Aryanism--or else an under-inclusive ground of responsibility-as in the
case where members disagree about some of the group's over-arching goals. And yet we
think it justifiable to assign responsibility to all members for acts undertaken in the service
of these goals.
More generally, the problem with deriving shared responsibility from shared
intentions is that the more diffuse the group, the more difficult it can be to identify an
intention (a) that informs and undergirds the group's act and (b) that all members share.
Shared intentions serve as a compelling ground of shared responsibility for smaller groups
with a narrowly defined purpose, and especially for ephemeral groups, which are
constituted by the shared act. For those groups, we may legitimately ascribe to each
member the intention to carry out the acts of the group. But as the group's size and the
scope of its projects grow, the notion that its members share an intention that links each to
the group act in a way that licenses a responsibility assignment becomes more and more
problematic. If we are to identify a ground of shared responsibility for these large and
multi-purpose collectives, we are likely to have to look to something other than shared
intentions.
D. Summary
This Article is now in a position to offer a more general diagnosis of the deficiencies
of the accounts surveyed in this Part. All of them aspire to justify shared responsibility not
just for small groups in which all members participate in each of the group's acts but also
for large groups where divisions of labor and divergence of purpose are the norm. We have
seen that these accounts fail to make good on that aspiration. In particular, all fail to explain
why membership is relevant. We can see the problem with special acuity where members
have not acted differently from outsiders (as in the case where both insiders and outsiders
benefit, or both insiders and outsiders support the kind of culture that facilitated the wrong),
or where members explicitly repudiate the group's wrong (as in cases where members share
in the larger group project but oppose the wrongful way some have chosen to carry it out,
or share in some subsidiary project, but diverge with respect to the group's larger purpose).
None of these accounts, then, provide a compelling justification for shanng responsibility
for corporate crime.
IV. SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR CORPORATE CRIME
In what sense, then, do executives share responsibility for their corporation's crime?
I argue here that corporate officers are causally responsible for corporate crime because
they sustain the corporation's capacity to act, or its agency. Their contributions to the
corporation's agency thereby provide a necessary causal link between these officers and
the corporation's crime that exists independent of their participation in that crime. But these
contributions, we shall see, do not ground these non-participants' responsibility. Instead, I
argue it is corporate officers' expected commitments to their corporations that ground their
responsibility.
I begin, in Part III.A, by describing the ways corporate officers contribute to the
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corporation's agency. To clarify, the role these contributions play in sustaining an
assignment of responsibility to executives for a corporate crime in which they did not
participate, I offer a novel way of analyzing a responsibility assignment in Part III.B. Part
III.C is the centerpiece of the Article's positive account, for it is there that I explicate the
justification for assigning responsibility to executives for a crime in which they did not
participate. In particular, I articulate a normatively rigorous and expansive conception of
an executive's professional role, and I locate the ground of her responsibility therein.
A. Executives and Group Action
Groups have no material existence. Though certain material objects may function
metonymically for the group-for example, the icon of the bitten apple for Apple
Computers or the Nike swoosh sign-groups are disembodied. Yet, they are recognizable
to us as entities that exist in our midst and act in our world. How can this be?
Two features are required for these disembodied entities to act in, and interact with,
the world: Groups must bear a distinct identity that extends through time, and they must
have mechanisms for transforming acts of some of their members into acts of the group.
Members of an institutional group who take an active part in its day-to-day operations help
to create and preserve the group's identity, and elaborate and reinforce its rules for having
some member's act count as an act of the group. In this way, these members sustain the
causal agency of the group, and they thereby come to bear causal responsibility for the
group's acts. Of relevance here, corporate officers participate in the life of their corporation
in just this way. As such, they come to be causally responsible for the corporation's agency
and so causally responsible, in a meaningful way, for all of the corporation's acts.
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to infer that causal responsibility suffices to ground
their moral responsibility for corporate wrongdoing. The account of responsibility I go on
to advance is not some kind of transmission function, whereby contributing to the
precursors of the corporation's crime-here, the corporation's ability to act-entails
responsibility for the crime. Instead, I shall argue that the ground of the executive's
responsibility flows from the normative dimensions of his role in the corporation. It is to
that argument that I now turn.
B. The Analytic Structure of a Responsibility Assignment
The nature of the relationship of an executive to some corporate wrong gets clearer
by analyzing the elements of a responsibility assignment. Theorists typically identify two
such elements-the object for which one is held responsible, and the reason or basis for
which one's conduct is reproachable. 94 But it is likely more useful to distill four elements
from a responsibility assignment: First, the act or result for which one is held responsible;
second, the connection one bears to that act or result; third, the features rendering that
connection reproachable; and, fourth, the magnitude of the responsibility assignment. For
94. See, e.g., KUTZ, supra note 38, at 4 (distinguishing the "object" of accountability-i.e., "the harm or
wrong for which [an individual] is reproached-from the "basis" of accountability-i.e., "the grounds for holding
the subject accountable"); cf Dan-Cohen, supra note 66, at 963 (distinguishing between "object-responsibility"
and "subject-responsibility" where the former points to an event or result and the latter points to a feature of one's
person that caused the event or result); Jeff McMahan, Collective Crime and Collective Punishment, CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 4, 6 (2008) (referring to the "bases, conditions or criteria of collective guilt").
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brevity's sake, I shall refer to these four elements, respectively, as the object, connection,
ground, and magnitude of one's responsibility.
For example, in the standard case of murder, the object of the killer's responsibility is
the victim's death, the connection is her causal relationship to the killing, and the ground
of her responsibility is her mental state-viz., her intention to kill the victim. Disentangling
the elements of connection and ground from the cruder category of a reason allows us to
see that the magnitude of a responsibility judgment varies according to the ground, and not
the connection. More specifically, the amount of reproach and the severity of the sanction,
turn on both the object for which one is held responsible and the ground of blame, but not
on the strength of one's connection to the act. Thus, Anglo-American law correctly treats
the perpetrator and accomplice who each intend to commit the crime as equally guilty even
though the former is more causally responsible for-i.e., she bears the stronger connection
to-the crime's commission. At the same time, the approach offered here also allows us to
see that both the ground and the object of responsibility inform its magnitude, rather than
merely its ground, as some accounts would maintain. 95 Accomplices, therefore, are
punished more severely than accessories-after-the-fact because even though the ground of
culpability is the same for both accomplices and accessories-both intend to aid the
perpetrator-the object of the accomplice's crime is the harm wrought by the perpetrator,
whereas the object of the accessory's crime is the act of assistance itself. Since the act of
assistance itself typically wreaks less material harm, it makes sense that the accessory is
deemed less culpable than is the accomplice. In other words, the magnitude varies here
strictly in light of the differing objects of responsibility as between the accessory and
accomplice, given that the ground of their responsibility is the same.
The four-part analysis tracks the law's treatment of criminal attempts as well: For both
attempted and completed crimes, the ground of responsibility is the same-viz., the
intention to commit the crime. Yet the law punishes the former far less harshly than the
latter. The fact that the object of responsibility differs for each explains the disparity in
sentencing: The successful perpetrator caused the harm she intended while the thwarted
perpetrator may have caused no material harm at all. In the next section, we shall see that
parsing a responsibility assignment in this way allows us to see why the corporation may
hold both participating and non-participating executives responsible for the same corporate
crime, even though the differing grounds of their respective responsibility assignments
entail vastly different magnitudes of responsibility.
C. Executives' Responsibility for a Group Transgression
Applying the analytic structure of responsibility just articulated, we arrive at the
following principle of shared responsibility: The object of responsibility for the executive
is the corporate crime, the connection she bears to it is the causal one of creating or
sustaining the corporation's capacity to act, and the ground of her responsibility is her
expected commitment to the corporation. And, as I shall argue, consonant with the
observations above: The magnitude of the executive's responsibility varies both according
95. On some Kantian accounts, desert is taken to turn exclusively on what the agent sought to do, and not
what she actually managed to do. Subjectivist understandings of criminal attempts, which contend that the law
should treat attempts no differently from completed crimes, are representative here. See generally R.A. Duff,
Subjectivism, Objectivism and Criminal Attempts, in HARM AND CULPABILITY (A.P. Simester ed., 1996).
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to the egregiousness of the corporate act and the stringency of her expected commitment
to the corporation, but not according to how much responsibility she bears for the
corporation's agency.
In this section, I expand on each of the four elements of group-based responsibility
just enumerated. Throughout, I contemplate only the executive who neither participated in,
nor culpably failed to prevent, her corporation's crime.
1. The Object of Responsibility
As indicated above, my claim is that the object of the executive's shared responsibility
is the corporation's crime, whether or not the executive participated in that crime. To
establish that claim, I first rule out other possible objects of responsibility, and then offer
some comments about our resistance to this object of responsibility.
When her corporation commits a crime, for what might we hold the executive
responsible? One reason is her employment in the corporation. This possible object of
responsibility is captured in the common sentiment experienced when one contemplates
another's membership in a transgressing group: "How could she possibly have joined, or
continued to be a part of, such a group?"'9 6 There is nothing illusory about membership as
an object of the executive's responsibility, and the moral valence of her membership-that
is, whether it is good or bad-will indeed turn upon the moral nature of the corporation's
acts. But membership is a personal object of responsibility: When we judge an individual
for her membership in a particular group, we are engaging in a straightforward act of
ascribing individual responsibility. Put differently, we are assessing her on the basis of
what her membership says about her. Our assessment thus ends with the expressive
dimensions of her membership; it does not contemplate a more material role in the group's
(or corporation's) transgression.
But perhaps we may hold the executive responsible for more than mere association
with a transgressing corporation. Given the role executives play in allowing the group to
act-again, through their contributions to the corporation's capacity to act-perhaps the
appropriate object of responsibility is the corporation's agency. On this thought, executives
would be held responsible not for the corporation's crime itself, but for a causal precursor
of the crime-in particular, the corporation's capacity to act. But the corporation's capacity
to act is at worst morally neutral; the great enthusiasm for the good society reaps from the
existence of corporations suggests that contributing to the corporation's capacity to act is
perhaps even laudable. In much the same way that the biological parents of a serial killer
do not-at least simply in virtue of their biological contributions-deserve our reproach,
so too executives do not, at least solely in virtue of their contributions to the corporation's
agency, deserve our indignation.
Can we, then, hold the executive-and in particular, the executive who did not
participate directly in the corporation's crime-responsible for the crime itself? The
following chain of reasoning would suggest that we cannot: We endeavor to determine the
set of individuals responsible for the crime by thinking about what kind of sanctions-both
emotional and material-a crime of that severity warrants. We are then led to the correct
96. But cf John Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational Corruption,
17 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1180-81 (2005) (arguing that our judgments of those who belong to corrupt
organizations wrongly presuppose that we would have done otherwise were we in the judged individuals' shoes).
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thought, that those who did not participate in the corporate crime do not deserve those
sanctions. But we then conclude-and here is where we go wrong-that these non-
participants must therefore bear no responsibility for the crime. The error arises because
we allow our judgments about the nature of the response the crime warrants to govern fully
our determination of who ought to be held responsible for the crime. But this is to put the
cart before the horse, and to leave something crucial out of the picture.
The missing piece is the executive's relationship to the corporation, which is forged
in light of the commitment expected of one who occupies her office. In particular, that
relationship connects her to the group act and confers upon her a normative status that
grounds her responsibility, as we shall see in the next two subsections. Further, that
relationship cabins the magnitude of her responsibility in a way that renders our response
to her significantly less severe than that which the direct perpetrator faces. In short, the
plausibility of holding an executive responsible for a corporate crime in which she did not
participate is an outstanding question-one that cannot be answered before undertaking the
explorations to which I now turn.
2. The Non-Participating Executive's Connection to the Corporate Crime
Recall that executives contribute to the corporation's agency in two ways: by helping
to secure and sustain the corporation's identity, and by elaborating and adhering to the rules
that make some employee's act an act of the corporation. These are more important kinds
of contributions than are, say, the contributions that the biological parents, or even the
actual parents, of an adult serial killer make to the serial killer's agency. For the serial killer
is an agent in his or her own right. While during childhood the eventual serial killer's
nascent agency was fostered and shepherded by her parents, their role is greatly
diminished-if not eradicated-once the serial killer reaches the age of maturity (assuming
that she has the mental competencies that qualify her for parental emancipation). The
corporation's agency, by contrast, is forever parasitic on the contributions of its members.
Despite the relatively important role that executives play in allowing the group to act,
I do not believe that these contributions justify holding executives responsible. My claim
is that these contributions serve to connect executives to the group act, but they do not
themselves constitute the ground of executives' responsibility. I defend that claim in two
steps: In this subsection, I appeal to intuition in an attempt to demonstrate that executives'
contributions to the corporation's agency do not function in the way that they need to if
they are to ground a responsibility assignment. In the next subsection, I advance a positive
argument for conceiving of executives' obligations of loyalty to the corporation, rather than
their contributions to the corporation's agency as the ground of their responsibility.
I indicated earlier that when assigning responsibility to someone, the magnitude of the
assignment turns on the egregiousness of the act ascribed to them as well as the nature of
the ground for ascribing it, but not on the strength of their connection to that act. If
executives' contributions to the corporation's agency were the ground of their
responsibility, then we should expect the responsibility of any executive to vary in some
direct way based on the magnitude of his or her contributions to the corporation's agency.
But a quick appeal to intuitions will disappoint this expectation.
For example, consider the member of the corporation who significantly contributes to
the corporation's identifiability, though she does not bear an especially strong relationship
to the corporation's crime. For instance, imagine that fraud has been uncovered at the
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perfume company of the starlet du jour. Though the starlet in question bears primary
responsibility for the perfume's identifiability-it bears her name and her image is featured
all over its promotional material-it is doubtful that we would think her more responsible
for the fraud than, say, the person in a senior management position, even if neither
participated in nor knew about the fraud. Conversely, consider the executive whose
contributions have little discernible effect on the corporation's identifiability, though she
undertakes her role ardently. Perhaps she asserts a vision for the corporation that fails to
be taken up. Or perhaps, she is among a chorus of voices heralding the existing character
of the corporation and so her voice fails measurably to impact the corporation's identity. I
doubt we would deem the causal inefficacy of her contributions a reason to diminish her
responsibility, especially if the corporate act for which we seek to assign responsibility is
consistent with the vision of the corporation that she endorses.
I do not intend these appeals to intuition to be decisive. Indeed, the reader who rejects
the analysis of a responsibility assignment offered above will find that they do no more
than beg the question. In the next subsection, however, I offer independent reasons for
thinking that executives' contributions to the corporation's agency are not themselves the
ground of their responsibility.
3. The Ground of the Executive's Responsibility
To arrive at the ground of the faultless executive's liability to blame, I begin by
inquiring into the circumstances when we are, and ought to be, inclined to praise the
executive for a feat of his company in which he did not participate. And, to make matters
more concrete and less arcane, I consider a case where a veritable outsider comes up with
a winning idea that the corporation adopts. As it happens, Frito-Lay's Flamin' Hot Cheetos
snack chips represent one such innovation. 9 7
Flamin' Hot Cheetos were the brainchild of a Frito-Lay janitor, who concocted the
recipe on a whim. With the encouragement of friends and family, he presented it to the
company president. 98 It was love at first bite, and Frito-Lay's best selling product line was
born.99
97. See, e.g., Tania Luviano, Our American Dream: The Janitor Who Invented Flamin'Hot Cheetos, Fox
NEWS LATINO (Mar. 26, 2012), http://latino.foxnews.con/Iatino/community/2012/03/26/our-american-dream-
richard-montanez-janitor-invents-hot-cheeto/#ixzz2cRtZDO1L (discussing a janitor's creation of Flamin' Hot
Cheetos and the success of the snack).
98. Id.
99. Id. Notwithstanding the enthusiastic description of Cheetos contained in the text above, I note that
Cheetos is a lightning rod in food justice debates, and rightly so. For one thing, the snack food has been deemed
"hyperpalatable" by food scientists and policy wonks, who believe it has been engineered to satisfy the brain's
pleasure centers maximally and so become addictive, even while its nutritional status is so poor. See generally
Monica Eng, Flamin' Hot Cheetos Inspire Fanatic Loyalty Among Kids, CHICAGO TRIB. (Oct. 11, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-10-I /news/chi-20yearold-snack-with-high-levels-of-salt-and-fat-
inspires-fanatic-loyalty-among-kids-20121011_1lashey-gearhardt-snacks-addiction. Second, as "the rich are
getting richer and the poor are getting poorer," Frito-Lay is seeking to "bifurcate" its market, by introducing more
healthy snacks in upscale groceries like Citarella, and pushing sales of low-nutritional value chips as a side dish-
rather than snack-in bodegas in communities where consumption of fresh produce is already tragically low.
Stephanie Strom, Frito-Lay Takes New Tack on Snacks, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 13, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/business/frito-lay-strategy-aims-for-top-and-bottom-of-
market.html?pagewanted=all& r=0 (quoting Ann Mukherjee, chief marketing officer at Frito-Lay North
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When and why might we praise the head of the company for the product's, and so the
company's, success? 100 After all, he did not participate in the product's creation. Nor
would it make sense to credit the president for delegating effectively. It is not as if he had
the foresight to identify and hire the talent that came up with the product-it is highly
unlikely that the company president participated in hiring the janitor, let alone that he
intuited the janitor's creative genius. 10 1 Of course, he can be credited with having
recognized greatness when he tasted it. But that recognition seems a far cry from authorship
or ownership of the idea, given that the creation just fell into the president's lap (or mouth,
as it were).
All of that is to say that our schemes for attributing acts or ideas do not readily allow
for us to ascribe the new food product in question to the company's president. Nonetheless,
once Flamin' Hot becomes a product line for Frito-Lay, it does seem appropriate to bestow
praise upon the president for this addition to his company's product line. Why is this?
A few considerations present themselves. First, praise might be useful from a
behavioral standpoint. As a reward, praise might encourage its target, and others who
witness his enjoyment of it, to try to act in a praise-generating manner in the future. A
similar argument might also be advanced to justify an executive bonus, which can be
construed as a material, rather than psychological, award. 102 The behaviorist explanation
presupposes, though, that the rewarded executive had a hand in the praised performance,
and that he and the others whom his reward motivates will have a similar ability to
positively influence performance going forward. For the very idea that a reward should
function as an incentive turns on the thought that those whom it is intended to incentivize
can, and do, make a difference to the company's bottom line. 10 3 But it is notoriously
difficult to draw a causal relationship between firm performance and executive
performance, as the management literature demonstrates. 104 This is especially true in the
America).
100. Frito-Lay is a "perennial rock" in PepsiCo's portfolio, according to a stock analyst at Goldman Sachs,
and the Flamin' Hot line of Cheetos is Frito-Lay's best selling snack. Strom, supra note 99.
101. On the other hand, the Frito-Lay president might contend that he created the kind of culture that led to
Montafiez's eureka moment since the president had sent a video message to all of the company's employees
encouraging them to act like owners of the company. Luviano, supra note 97. Montafiez was inspired, and it was
not long thereafter that he hit upon the chile-infused Cheetos idea. Id. Still, this seems a rather slim basis for
giving the Frito-Lay's president credit for the Flamin' Hot line. The video message might have been nothing more
than an effort to boost employee morale. Less cynically, even if the president had hoped the message would
generate some new ideas, it seems far-fetched that he could have reasonably believed the video stood a good
chance of producing a product idea that turned out to be as popular and as lucrative as Montafiez's. Thus, the
video was, at best, a shot in the dark.
102. To see that such plans are explicitly about performance incentives, one need only consult a public
corporation's SEC filing detailing its bonus compensation scheme. See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc., Executive Incentive
Plan (Exhibit 10.15), (Feb., 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/10 11006/000119312510043149/dexlI 015.htm; Symantec, FY 13
Executive Annual Incentive Plan (Exhibit 10.30), (May 5, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/849399/000119312512241997/d3I8934dex 1030.htm [hereinafter
Symantec Incentive Plan].
103. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-Its Not How Much You Pay, But How, 68
HARv. Bus. REv. (May 1990) (describing "three basic [compensation] policies will create the right monetary
incentives for CEOs to maximize the value of their companies").
104. See, e.g., Michael Beer et al., "Do Incentives Work?," AOM Research Paper at 4, available at
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/98-078_5de6b935-5 1b9-42c9-a74 1 -ce36da60073d.pdf
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case of a company president or CEO. 10 5 So the behaviorist justification seems to overstate,
or over-estimate, executive power.
If that is true, however, then desert, at least as traditionally conceived, does not
provide the rationale for praise or financial rewards either. Under the traditional
conception, one deserves a reward if and only if one has made a discernible positive
contribution to some desirable outcome. 106 Therefore, the traditional conception enshrines
a commitment to individual responsibility. But we do not reward executives only when
they have discernibly contributed to their corporations' successes. Instead, merely
occupying their position at a time when the company does well, by whatever metric it
chooses to measure its performance, suffices for a reward. Thus, a standard executive
bonus plan measures the executive's bonus in light of corporate revenue and/or corporate
earnings per share for the fiscal year in question. 107 For example at PepsiCo, Frito-Lay's
parent company the CEO receives his bonus just so long as the company meets or exceeds
its earnings target. 108
One could, of course, contend that overall firm performance is an effective proxy for
the executive's performance, such that the executive can rightly claim responsibility for
the firm's success. But that contention would seem to have as its corollary a (troubling)
ground for assigning the executive blame for some act of wrongdoing of the firm: If the
firm's success is evidence of the executive's positive impact so too the firm's wrongdoing
must then be evidence of the executive's negative impact. But the latter claim, that the firm
engaged in wrongdoing at least in part because the executive acted in an untoward way, is
specious-the we know that many corporate crimes arise without the executive's
foreknowledge, let alone his participation. 109 So the claim that the corporation's success
arose at least in part because the executive acted in some laudable way need not be true
either.
There is a more plausible way of understanding the relationship between the firm's
("researchers [have] been unable to establish that incentive compensation is causally related to firm
performance").
105. Renee B. Adams et al., Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance, 18 REV. FIN.
STUD. 1403, 1429-30 (2005) (research suggesting that CEO power does not affect performance on average,
although CEOs have greater affects on performance in firms where the CEO wields a lot of power relative to
those where decision-making power is more diffuse). More generally, the great weight of management scholarship
holds that CEOs have only a minor, and perhaps even a negligible, impact on firm performance. See, e.g., Joel
M. Podolny et al., Revisiting the Meaning ofLeadership, in 26 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. I (Barry
M. Staw & Roderick M. Kramer eds., 2005); SYDNEY FINKELSTEIN & DONALD C. HAMBRICK, STRATEGIC
LEADERSHIP: TOP EXECUTIVES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON ORGANIZATIONS (1996).
106. It's possible that the traditional conception is more forgiving than the formulation I offer in the text
accompanying this footnote, rewarding the executive just so long as he tried to make a positive contribution, even
if his contribution ultimately had no effect. Even still, one would imagine that a reward for effort alone would be
rare, arising only when, for example, the executive's attempt would ordinarily have worked yet unusual or
unforeseeable circumstances thwarted it.
107. See e.g., Symtantec Incentive Plan, supra note 102.
108. PepsiCo, Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form Def.
14A) (Mar. 24, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/77476/000119312506062537/ddefl4a.htm ("For
the fiscal year 2005, [the CEO's] base salary continued to be capped at $1,000,000. He was eligible for a 2005
annual incentive award because PepsiCo achieved its pre-approved earnings target which was set to achieve third
quartile performance relative to peer companies.").
109. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) (affirming corporate
defendant's conviction despite employee's violation of express company policy).
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performance and the executive's reward, however, which has little to do with the extent of
the executive's causal contribution to the firm's success. As I argued in Part II, it is
frequently foolhardy to seek to disaggregate individual contributions in the face of the
complex network of interactions that yield corporate action. Even if we can isolate
individual inputs, it might be impossible to assign individual causal responsibility for
outputs, given the complex ways in which these inputs might combine and influence the
contributions of others. And it is not just epistemic complications that should give us pause.
The very prospect of seeking to disentangle the causal web is unseemly, as it is antithetical
to the joint nature of the enterprise.
Let us begin by considering an employment relationship governed fully by prudential
norms. Some such relationships allow both employee and employer to proceed in an
entirely self-regarding way. Each is a free agent. The relationship can nonetheless be
mutually beneficial, at least while both parties share the same goals. But assuming no
contractual terms to the contrary, no justified complaint of disloyalty will lie if the
employee walks away, or if the employer terminates the employee, when the relationship
ceases to benefit the party that ruptures it.
A corporation's executives, by contrast, do not enjoy the purely self-regarding stance
that other employees might rightfully occupy. An executive position can be defined by any
number of explicit tasks and responsibilities, but this Article contemplates something more
diffuse, which goes to the spirit with which the executive should hold his office. The duty
of loyalty can be understood to capture this spirit-loyalty to the joint enterprise and to
those with whom one pursues it. And this loyalty in turn explains and motivates the
attitudes the executive might adopt, and be expected to adopt, in pursuing his tasks and
responsibilities-assiduousness, attention to the company's welfare even at a cost to his
own, a willingness to view himself as a part of an enterprise larger than him and to conduct
himself accordingly. For ease of reference, I refer to the loyalty and the attitudes to which
it should give rise as the executive's commitment.
We praise or reward the executive when his corporation does well, then, because it is
the right way to acknowledge his commitment to the corporation. When it comes to
bonuses, for example, we do not require that the executive significantly improve the
company's bottom line as a condition of bestowing the reward because proceeding in that
way would unduly single the executive out. If the corporation's compensation committee
were to try to discern just what role the executive played, or didn't play, in the company's
success, it would undermine the sense that all of the corporation's senior officers (and other
employees as well) are part of a team, or "in it" together. 1 1 0 It would fail, that is, to honor
the attitudes of loyalty that the corporation should foster.
This is not to say that the executive's conduct can never influence his bonus. The
compensation committee might enhance his bonus above the standard amount where the
executive has measurably contributed to improving the company's bottom line, just as it
might limit or even withhold the bonus amount if the executive has proceeded with a
disaffection unsuited to his office. The point, however, is that all else being equal the
executive can and should receive some reward just so long as the firm performs well, and
110. Cf Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv.
247, 264 (1999) (stressing the importance of "lateral interaction" among team members as opposed to hierarchical
governance, which should have the role of mediating "horizontal disputes" among team members).
[Vol. 40:2
Crossing the Fault Line in Corporate Criminal Law
independent of whether he proximately caused the improved performance. Rewarding him
when the company does well solidifies the sense that his and the company's fortunes go
hand-in-hand, and acknowledges that he has internalized this sense of shared fate through
his commitment.
If that's right, though, one might wonder why we bestow the reward only when the
corporation does well. After all, the executive who maintains his position even as the
corporation is faring poorly demonstrates a great commitment to the enterprise too-
certainly greater than that of an executive who jumps ship at the first sign of a company's
downturn, at any rate. As it turns out, however, withholding a reward during a downturn is
entirely consistent with acknowledging the executive's commitment, for the withholding
is just another way of underscoring and honoring the fact that the executive's fate is
intertwined with that of his firm. In short, just as rewarding the executive when the
corporation does well affirms the fact that he is part of a larger entity, and that its welfare
and his are aligned, so too does withholding the reward when the corporation does poorly.
With this understanding of the ground of praise and reward in hand, we are now in a
position to identify the ground of shared blame: The corporation has committed a crime,
and it is time to assign responsibility for it. The crime's individual perpetrators are, of
course, the most likely and deserving candidates. But just as the executive need not have
proximately caused the corporation's success to justly earn his bonus, neither must he have
proximately caused the corporation's crime to justly earn our censure. Faced with the
complex network of interactions within the corporate web, we are not in a position to
discern whether or to what extent the executive's activities facilitated the crime. But even
if we were, we would do violence to the norms governing the executive's position if we
undertook this effort to individualize responsibility. We blame the executive, independent
of whether he is culpable for the crime, as a way of honoring and affirming his
commitment. And, if he is suitably loyal, he should see himself as implicated in all of the
corporation's acts, and so should recognize that we treat him justly when we see him in
this way too.
One might be willing to concede that the executive ought to accept blame but deny
that the norms underpinning his acceptance should have any implications for the way that
we-outsiders to the corporation-ought to treat him, or at least deny that these norms
license our blaming him. And indeed the objection should give us pause. The claim I defend
here is not that the norms of the organization are normative for outsiders. Just as the
corporation's rules of recognition do not on their own determine when outsiders are
licensed in ascribing some act of the corporation's employee to the corporation itself,
neither do its norms of loyalty, solidarity and so on determine when and to whom outsiders
are licensed in assigning responsibility for the corporation's acts. We should accept the
corporation's rules and norms only if we have independent reason to find them valuable. I
contend that when it comes to the corporation's norms of loyalty, solidarity, and so on--
those norms that obligate the high-level executive to accept responsibility for a corporate
wrong (as well as for a corporate success)-we do have such reason.
More specifically, we should want the executive to conceive himself as bound up with
the corporation-to see that its acts redound to him. If he conceives himself in this way, he
will have a greater incentive to monitor the corporation, by supporting those initiatives that
look likely to lead to its success and stymying those that look likely to get it into trouble.
But in addition to promoting corporate activity that is good and deterring that which is bad,
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the relationship of allegiance is valuable in its own right.
Our lives are made better through joint activity, not just because of the products of
such activity (the idea behind the saying that "many heads are better than one") but also
because doing things with others is itself a source of value. Relationships within profit-
seeking organizations provide many of the same goods that members obtain in groups that
are not about profit at all, such as the relationships among members of the same place of
worship, or card playing group, or informal sports league, or extended family. Membership
in groups of these kinds provides us with a sense of community, a sense of belonging, a
sense of being part of something larger than ourselves. To be sure, the member does not
experience these goods immediately upon joining the group; they develop out of the time
she spends there. And alongside the typical experience of membership-indeed, what
makes it possible-is that the member comes to adopt a certain stance toward the group
and toward her fellows. She comes to see herself as belonging to, and being involved in
something larger than herself. 11
To occupy this stance, she must internalize a set of norms, and expect these norms of
her fellows, as they expect them of her: Membership gives her a reason to take account of
the interests of the group, and the interests of her fellows by extension, in ways she had no
reason to before. Membership gives her a reason-when she is in the space of the group-
to partake of its practices, even if she would never abide by these outside of the group. For
example, a member of a Francophile organization will come to comfortably greet her
fellows with a two-cheek kiss, even though the gesture felt strange and strained when she
first joined the group, and is one she would never offer outside of the group. And
membership gives her a reason to seek to acknowledge and solidify the bonds between
members, by acting in ways that reflect her recognition that the group has a hold on her-
that she owes it and her fellows loyalty.
Group action that is the subject ofjudgment-praise or blame-provides occasion for
the member to exhibit the solidarity expected of her, by eschewing the prerogative that she
enjoys outside the group to be judged in isolation from others. Instead, she should
recognize, and the good group member will recognize, that the judgment issued is not about
her individually, it is about her qua group member. And so long as the group action is
judged correctly, the resulting judgment is at least prima facie correctly assigned to her qua
group member. Thus she should, all else equal, see that she is an appropriate object of
praise when the group does well, and an appropriate object of blame when the group does
wrong-independent of what she contributed to the particular success or wrong for which
the group is being judged. That she is inclined to see herself in this way is reflective of the
norms of solidarity and loyalty that help make group relationships valuable.
Further, given the value in these relationships, we have reason to honor them-to take
her acceptance of praise or blame at face value, rather than to seek to judge her on the basis
of her own merits. One could state the point by contending that assessing each member on
the basis of her own merits would undermine the source of value in these relationships. But
there is perhaps a stronger way of putting it, which would involve denying that there is
anything like one's own merits when it comes to group action. To be a member is to forsake
any notion that one has an identity apart from the group when it comes to judgment for
111. Cf DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 97-111 (2012) (offering a similar account
of the genesis of the bonds of friendship, and the corresponding obligations that come to obtain between friends).
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group action. Thus, to express our appreciation of the value of membership is to treat the
member in a way that respects what has been forsaken, by responding to the member in the
way she would have us respond to her.
With that said, I note an important qualification. I have been referring to praise or
blame the member deserves independent of her participation when all else is equal. It is
now time to shed some light on circumstances that make it the case that all else is not
equal. 112 In particular, consider the dissident group member who sincerely and valiantly
protested against (what she perceived to be) a group wrong prior to its commission. In this
example, although she did everything she could to prevent the act in question, the group
committed the act anyway. We might think her vocal opposition sufficient to exempt her
from membership responsibility. When considering this possibility, we might think of two
stages. First, a member's commitment to the group furnishes a presumption that she is an
appropriate object of praise for its feats or blame for its wrongs, independent of her
participation in either. At a second stage, the member can seek to defeat the presumption
in light of countervailing considerations, chief among which is the member's dissent.
Various factors will determine whether the member succeeds, including the gravity of the
group offense (or the magnitude of its accomplishment), the strenuousness of the member's
protest efforts, and the extent to which she otherwise remains a committed group member.
I elaborate on the nature and role of these factors elsewhere. 113 For ease of exposition here,
however, I assume that no countervailing considerations defeat an assignment of blame for
the executive in question. All that we have is a corporate offense that the executive neither
participated in nor knew about in advance and the presumption that he bears blame simply
by virtue of his role will go unchallenged.
So, all else equal, we may praise or blame the group member just by virtue of what
the group has done. More to the point, we may praise or blame the executive by virtue of
what the corporation has done, again all else equal. With that said, praising and blaming
are a far cry from rewarding and punishing. I seek to make the move from the former to
the latter in Parts V and VI. The aim here has been to lay the moral foundation for blame.
A couple of clarifications make that foundation more solid.
First, given that I arrive at the account of shared blame by culling insights from our
practice of shared praise, one might be tempted to construe the account as just another
species of the benefits-based accounts we encountered in Part III, where incurring benefits
and burdens from membership were just two sides of the same coin. But, to be clear, the
claim here is not: "The executive gets to enjoy rewards when the corporation does well, so
it follows automatically, or as a matter of consistency, that he should incur punishment
when the corporation does wrong." Instead the claim is more fundamental: The
considerations that justify the executive's liability to praise, and also his reward, are the
very same ones that justify his liability to blame and also whatever sanctions appropriately
112. I note that the assignment of responsibility is prima facie correct, or correct when all else is equal, to
allow for the possibility that there may be countervailing considerations that undercut the assignment. Elsewhere,
I deal with these considerations at length, focusing in particular on the case of group members who vocally and
strenuously opposed the group act for which the group is now judged. See Sepinwall, supra note 15, at 231-6 1.
It would be beyond the scope of this Article to undertake an excursion into these considerations. For now, then,
we may assume that the generic member contemplated here does not have available to her a set of considerations
that would render our judgment of her inapt.
113. Id.
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flow from it. In particular, the executive's commitment is the common explanation for his
sharing responsibility for both the corporation's feats and its crimes. That the relationship
between the corporation's acts and the executive's responsibility is mediated through the
executive's commitment marks a significant distinction from benefits-based accounts.
Those accounts viewed both the benefits and burdens of membership in a group as coming
with the territory, as it were. But they left opaque the reason for which any benefits or
burdens should come with the territory. They could not explain what it was about
membership that licensed assignment of benefits or burdens and for that reason could not
justify restricting benefits or burdens to members alone. The account advanced here, by
contrast, identifies the executive's commitment as the ground for his justly enjoying praise
and incurring blame for the corporation's activities. Since individuals who are not members
of the corporation are not expected to harbor a commitment to it, we have a ready way of
defending the differential treatment they receive.
In describing the executive's commitment and its role in grounding his liability to
praise and blame, I have deployed overtly moral rhetoric, casting matters in terms of
commitment, loyalty, intertwining of fates, etc. As a result, one might think the conception
of the executive's role operating here implausibly romantic or at least overly demanding.
After all, most modem executives acknowledge that they have commitments to their
corporation but only up to a point. And there is a separate worry that holding all executives
responsible, independent of their contributions to the corporation's crime (or success), will
entail that we treat all of these executives equally, subjecting them to equal amounts of
censure (or praise). To allay these concerns, we need to add one more piece to the puzzle-
an inquiry into the way in which the magnitude of the executive's responsibility varies
according to the commitment the corporation demands of her.
4. The Magnitude of the Executive's Responsibility
Not all executives are expected to bear the same amount of loyalty to their respective
corporations. Instead, there are (at least) four sources of variation in the stringency of the
commitment expected of them and the corresponding amount of responsibility they ought
to bear for the corporation's crime. First, the strength of the commitment expected of
executives may vary simply on the basis of the kind of corporation in question. For
example, a closely held corporation may expect-and be known to expect-a strong
commitment on the part of its officers (who will often be its directors as well). It will claim
much in the way of officers' time and energy and also demand much in the way of their
allegiance to the group. Large, publicly traded corporations may expect its officers to
operate at a much greater remove and experience only a very weak sense of allegiance to
the group.
Second, there may be much variation in the stringency of the commitment expected
even within the same kind of business organization. For example, cultural differences
between corporations of similar size may account for disparities in the amount of allegiance
they demand. Thus some corporations may demand strong devotion to the corporation's
welfare while others permit a greater sense of detachment.
Third, one's rung on the corporate hierarchy and the nature of one's duties likely also
inform the strength of the commitment one is expected to bear. Thus, as a general matter,
the CEO might be expected to evidence more dedication to the corporation than, say, the
VP of marketing. At the same time, the expected strength of commitment need not vary
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strictly along the corporate ladder. Instead, in some corporations, one's job description-
the actual duties and responsibilities one is expected to fulfill-may be far more indicative
of the strength of one's expected commitment than is one's job title.
Finally, no matter the level of commitment expected by the company itself, individual
officers may vary with respect to the amount of allegiance they expect of themselves. Thus,
some executives may view the expected strength of commitment as fully consonant with
their strength of attachment to the corporation, and they may contribute no more or less,
and exhibit no more or less allegiance, than what the corporation expects. Other executives,
as a result perhaps of a sense of dissatisfaction with the corporation, may believe that it
expects more of them than it deserves; these executives may contribute less than the
corporation expects and insist more upon their separateness from the corporation than is
consistent with the expectations attaching to their office. Finally, some executives may
willingly exceed the corporation's expected level of commitment; they may throw
themselves into the life of the corporation and feel as if their fates and its, are especially
strongly entwined.
In articulating these four ways in which the strength of executives' expected
commitments may vary within and between corporations, I have assumed that it is possible
to measure the extent of expected or actual allegiance. I will not offer a methodology for
doing so here, leaving that task instead to sociologists and institutional psychologists. In
what follows, I rely on the following two assumptions: First, as someone decides whether
to assume a particular position within the corporation, he or she can gain a feel for the
strength of allegiance the position demands; and, second, we can, at least with the help of
social science, arrive at least at a relative ordering of the strength of the commitment
expected of different positions that allows us to determine the magnitude of a responsibility
assignment appropriate to aim at individual executives.
What are the implications, then, of these varying levels of allegiance for the
executive's responsibility? In the analysis of the structure of a responsibility assignment I
offered above, I noted that the magnitude of an individual's responsibility varies according
to the nature of the act for which she is held responsible and the ground of her
responsibility. Applying that analysis here, I contend that the executive's responsibility is
proportionate to whichever is greater-the strength of the commitment the corporation
expects of him or the strength of his felt allegiance. I argue, in other words, that the
expected strength of the commitment sets the threshold for the executive's responsibility
and, further, that enhanced responsibility is in order where his felt allegiance is greater than
that which the corporation expects of him. Let us consider in turn the theoretical
possibilities that arise once we determine that the executive's commitment to the
corporation grounds his responsibility for the corporation's crime.
First, we could adopt a fully psychologized notion of fidelity, in which case the
executive's responsibility would vary strictly according to the strength of his allegiance.
Second, we could reject a psychological conception of fidelity, and restrict the magnitude
of the executive's responsibility to the magnitude of the commitment the corporation
expects of him. Third, where the executive's felt allegiance diverged from his expected
allegiance, we could hold a member to the lesser of his felt or expected allegiance. Finally,
we could hold the executive to the greater of his felt or expected allegiance, as I believe we
should. Let us consider the cogency of each of these alternatives in turn.
Under the first alternative, the disaffected executive-that is, the executive who
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experienced a weaker allegiance to the corporation than that expected of him-would be
held responsible just to the extent of the strength of his allegiance. If the executive
experienced no allegiance to the corporation, he would be off the hook altogether.
Something like this lies at the core of accounts of shared responsibility that predicate
members' responsibility upon their positive identification with the group. 114 However, it
is often counterintuitive to absolve or implicate someone solely on the basis of theirfe/t
connection to the group. After all, as we saw, non-members might strongly identify with
the group and, yet, not bear responsibility for the group's acts, while members might
psychologically disengage from the group and yet rightly be held responsible. A non-
psychologized notion of allegiance helps to justify our intuitions in these cases: If an
objective expectation of allegiance underpins the assignment of responsibility, then it
makes sense that we should resist holding responsible the outsider whose connection to the
group is solely psychological, while seeking to impose responsibility on the member who
denies any psychological connection.
Perhaps, then, the way to proceed is to fix responsibility solely to the group's expected
level of allegiance. Under this second alternative, executives who experienced an
allegiance greater than the expected level would not come to incur any more responsibility
than would those whose level of allegiance met or fell below the corporation's threshold.
The problem with this alternative is that it ignores the expressive dimensions of an
executive's allegiance. When we contemplate the responsibility of the group member who
did not participate in a group crime, we ought to consider not just the fact that his role
entailed that he would relinquish, to an extent compatible with the group's expected
allegiance, his entitlement to be judged apart from the group; we ought also consider-and
I believe we do also consider-the fact that he felt an especially strong connection to the
group. Thus, for example, we think it proper to respond more harshly to the Nazi supporter
than to the indifferent German citizen, even if neither participated in any acts of
persecution. Similarly, in contemplating the WorldCom fraud, we think it proper to scorn
the WorldCom executive who supported the aggressive culture of profit-seeking instituted
by CEO Bernie Ebbers 115 while we resist condemning the executive who silently opposed
it, even if neither participated in WorldCom's fraud. Part of the disparity in our response
may flow from a sense that the supporter bears a stronger causal connection to, say,
WorldCom's fraud than does the indifferent or silent employee, since the former's support
may have emboldened or otherwise encouraged those who carried out Ebbers' agenda. Part
of the disparity in responses, however, likely also stems from a sense that the supporter is
a worse person independent of the effect of his support on the acts in question. "How could
you have felt so loyal to a corporation that would tramp so callously on individuals'
interests?" is a question that runs through our minds. The second alternative, in which we
operate exclusively with a non-psychologized notion of allegiance, cannot accommodate
or make sense of this harsher response.
That being said, neither can the third alternative, in which we hold a member
114. See, e.g., Farid Abdel-Nour, National Responsibility, 31 POLIT, THEORY 693, 703 (2003) (identifying
several examples of positive identification with certain groups).
115. See Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of
WorldCom, Inc. 18-19 (Mar. 31, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/7 2 3 5 2 7/00 0 093176303001862/dex991.htm (stating that WorldCom's
culture of misconduct began at the top, with CEO Ebbers).
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responsible in proportion with the lesser of his actual or expected allegiance. Under the
third alternative, if the executive were to feel less committed than he ought, his
responsibility would be reduced accordingly-and improperly, as the discussion of the first
alternative demonstrated. On the other hand, if the executive were more committed to the
transgressing corporation than he was expected to be, his greater allegiance would not earn
him extra sanction. As we have seen, this too presents a problem. In short, this third
alternative suffers from the problems that caused us to reject both the first and second
alternatives.
We are left then, as I believe we should be, with the fourth alternative: We ought to
set the threshold for our response to the executive at a level that corresponds to the
corporation's expected level of allegiance, for an executive ought not to be exculpated
because he failed to participate in the life of the group or experience the alignment of
interests that lie at the core of a commitment to the joint project. Where the executive
experiences an allegiance to the corporation greater than that which the corporation
expects, however, it is appropriate to hold him more responsible than we hold the executive
whose allegiance is less than or equal to that which the corporation expects of him, for the
more committed member expresses a deeper allegiance to the group through his stronger
commitment. Through this enhanced commitment, the executive signifies that he is
prepared to relinquish his entitlement to be judged apart from the group to an extent greater
than that which the group demands of him. While his willingness to incur more
responsibility than is required of him, qua non-participating executive, is not itself a reason
to hold him more responsible, the support for the group that this willingness communicates
is such a reason. In other words, he deserves additional reprobation because he expresses,
through his stronger allegiance, additional approval of the corporation even as it
transgresses. With these pieces of theory in hand, it is now time to return to doctrine.
V. TRANSLATING THE EXECUTIVE'S LIABILITY TO BLAME INTO LIABILITY TO
PUNISHMENT
The vast majority of the doctrines allowing for the prosecution of a corporate
executive for his corporation's crimes require that the executive play a culpable role in the
corporation's crime. Most straightforwardly, an executive who participated in the crime
may be prosecuted on a theory of direct liability. 116 Thus, for example, Rule 1Ob-5,
promulgated in light of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, allows for the prosecution
of executives who engaged in willful deceit, manipulation or fraud. 117 Similarly,
Sarbanes-Oxley requires certain executives to certify the accuracy of their corporation's
financial statements, and subjects these executives to criminal liability if the statements are
subsequently found to be fraudulent and the executive knew of the inaccuracies at the time
he certified them. 118
Against a backdrop where the fault principle undergirds most of the ways in which
116. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 (stating that an agent is subject to a third party harmed
by the agent's conduct).
117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see Allan Horwich, An Inquiry into the Perception of Materiality as an Element
of Scienter Under SEC Rule l0b-5, 67 Bus. LAW. 1, 4 (2011) (noting that Rule 10b-5 requires proof that the
defendant "willfully" violated the provision).
118. Sarbannes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002).
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executives come to bear criminal liability for their corporation's crimes, the RCO doctrine
is a notable exception. The RCO doctrine permits the prosecution and punishment of a
corporate executive who had the authority and power to prevent her corporation's crime
and failed to do so.119 Moreover, the doctrine extends to the executive whether or not she
knew about the crime in advance; where she did not, she obviously could not have
prevented it. But the RCO doctrine allows for her to be prosecuted and punished
nonetheless. 12 0 Put bluntly, the RCO doctrine permits the state to hold criminally liable
executives who, in the traditional conception of culpability, are innocent of their
corporation's crime.
No wonder, then, that the RCO doctrine generated outrage at the moment of its
announcement, 1 2 1 and that scholars continue to decry its use in cases where the prosecuted
executive did not know, and could not have known, of his subordinates' crime, and so
could not have prevented it. 12 2 We are now in a position to see that their reactions result
from an unduly constrained understanding of blameworthiness. The purpose of this Article
is to contest and expand that understanding. The last Part advanced the moral arguments
for blame. Here, I begin the transposition to law by describing the RCO doctrine. In Part
VI, I argue that the account of executive blame licenses our prosecuting and punishing
corporate officers under the doctrine.
A. The RCO Doctrine
The RCO doctrine provides for the prosecution and punishment of an executive for a
crime of his corporation in which he did not participate and of which he might even have
been ignorant. Thus, in the case where the Supreme Court first announced the doctrine, the
Court upheld the conviction of a corporate president for his company's misbranding and
adulteration of drugs shipped in interstate commerce even though there was "no
evidence... of any personal guilt on [the defendant's]... part... [and] no proof or claim
that he ever knew of the introduction into commerce of the adulterated drugs in question,
119. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 282-83 (1943).
120. The Supreme Court later added a defense of objective impossibility. United States v. Park, 421 U.S.
658 (1975). That defense still permits conviction of the executive who could not have prevented the corporation's
offense because he did not know of it in time, so long as it was within his power to obtain that knowledge. Where
this is so, we might say that it was subjectively impossible for the defendant to have prevented the crime (how
could he stop a crime of which he was ignorant?) but not objectively impossible for him to have done so.
121. Dotterweich, which inaugurated the RCO doctrine, was a 5 to 4 decision, with Justice Murphy authoring
a vigorous dissent in which he decried the Court's departure from the tenets of individual culpability. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. at 286 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("It is a fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that guilt
is personal and that it ought not lightly to be imputed to a citizen who, like the respondent, has no evil intention
or consciousness of wrongdoing."). Justice Murphy also condemned the Court's violation of the principle of
legality, writing: "each person, regardless of economic or social status, [is entitled] to an unequivocal warning
from the legislature as to whether he is within the class of persons subject to vicarious liability. Congress cannot
be deemed to have intended to punish anyone who is not 'plainly and unmistakably' within the confines of the
statute." Id.
122. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 21, at 1359; Brent J. Gurney et al., The Crime of Doing Nothing: Strict
Liability for Corporate Officers Under the FDCA, 22 ANDREwS LITIG. REP. 2, 2 (2007), available at
http://www.wiMlmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale-Shared-Content/Files/Editoria/Pubication/The-Crime
_ofDoingNothing.pdf (referring to the doctrine as "alarming"); Jennifer Bragg et al., Onus of Responsibility:
The Changing Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 525 (2010) (contending that
the doctrine is "at odds with fundamental notions of our criminal justice system").
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much less that he actively participated in their introduction."' 123 In this way, the Supreme
Court opened the door to executive criminal liability without fault.
The potentially vast reach of the doctrine emerged some 30 years later in the Court's
next RCO case. United States v. Park affirmed the conviction of John Park, president and
chief executive officer of Acme Supermarkets, for a rodent infestation at an Acme
warehouse. 124 Acme is a national retail food chain that, at the time, had "approximately
36,000 employees, 874 retail outlets, 12 general warehouses, and four special
warehouses." 125 The infested warehouse was located in Baltimore, whereas Park's office
was situated in Philadelphia, along with company headquarters. 126 Further, Park
testified that although all of Acme's employees were in a sense under his general
direction, the company had an 'organizational structure for responsibilities for
certain functions' according to which different phases of its operation were
'assigned to individuals who, in turn, have staff and departments under them.'
He identified those individuals responsible for sanitation, and related that upon
receipt of the January 1972 FDA letter, he had conferred with the vice president
for legal affairs, who informed him that the Baltimore division vice president
'was investigating the situation immediately and would be taking corrective
action and would be preparing a summary of the corrective action to reply to the
letter.' [Park] stated that he did not 'believe there was anything (he) could have
done more constructively than what (he) found was being done. 127
The Court found Park's claims of innocence unavailing. Given that Acme had violated
provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938 by sending into interstate
shipment adulterated foods, the Court argued that it was appropriate to hold criminally
responsible some of its officers, on the principle that "those corporate agents vested with
the responsibility, and power commensurate with that responsibility, to devise whatever
measures are necessary to ensure compliance with the Act bear a 'responsible relationship'
to, or have a 'responsible share' in, violations." 128 Importantly, the ground of the
executive's criminal liability was, the Court maintained, not in his causal contribution to
the offense. Instead, the Court contended that the officer's position of authority sufficed
for blame: "The concept of a 'responsible relationship' to, or a 'responsible share' in, a
violation of the Act indeed imports some measure of blameworthiness." 12 9 The rationale
for the conviction lay, then, in the expectations undergirding the role itself. Causal
123. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 286 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
124. Park, 421 U.S. at 679-83. As Richard Singer and Doug Husak note, Park has been said to be the first
United States Supreme Court opinion that actually embraces strict criminal liability for purposes of conviction.
Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert
Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 859, 874 (1999).
125. Park, 421 U.S. at 660.
126. Idat660-61.
127. Id at 663-64.
128. Id. at 671. It may be worth noting that, although Acme was also convicted of the violations, the
corporation's conviction is not a predicate for the conviction of the responsible corporate officer. See, e.g.,
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 279 ("Equally baseless is the claim of [the corporate president] that, having failed to
find the corporation guilty, the jury could not find him guilty. Whether the jury's verdict was the result of
carelessness or compromise or a belief that the responsible individual should suffer the penalty instead of merely
increasing, as it were, the cost of running the business of the corporation, is immaterial.").
129. Park, 421 U.S. at 673.
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responsibility was not relevant because, in a large corporation, presumably many high-
level executives possess the authority and power to prevent, for example, a rodent
infestation. If more than one of these high-level executives omits to prevent the infestation,
none of them can be said to be a but-for cause of the corporation's crime. Instead, it must
be something about the role itself that is sufficient to implicate the executive. While the
Court does not elucidate the lofty but vague concept of a "responsible relationship," I
believe that its best interpretation-the one that represents the law "in the better light 13 0 -
is the one that I advanced in Part IV, according to which a corporate officer may be
blameworthy just in virtue of her role. 131 In light of the financial crisis, we have good
reason to urge that the doctrine be put to greater use.
VI. CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR FAULTLESS CORPORATE EXECUTIVES
Why prosecute the responsible corporate officer? Given that the RCO doctrine is
sometimes invoked in civil suits, and given the deep discomfort with faultless criminal
liability, one could propose a two-track deployment of the doctrine, with criminal liability
reserved for those cases in which the executive could have prevented the corporation's
crime but failed to do so, and civil liability imposed for cases where the executive could
not have done so.132 Yet because civil liability would fail to track the moral meaning of
responsibility on the account of shared responsibility I advanced, I shall seek, in Part VIA,
to defend a more controversial proposal, under which criminal liability would be
permissible whether or not the executive could have prevented the corporation's crime.
Concomitant with this defense, I shall, in Part VI.B, suggest (non-incarcerative) sanctions
that reflect the nature of the executive's responsibility as I conceive of it. These sanctions
will serve to diminish, if not eliminate, concerns about criminal liability for the defendant
who does not meet the hallmarks of individual culpability. In Part VI.C, I seek to round out
the account by describing the scope of criminal liability I believe it permits.
A. Prosecuting Responsible Corporate Officers
In Part IV, I sought to articulate a moral argument for the propriety of assigning blame
to executives. To recap: I argued that the executive is blameworthy in light of her
commitment to the corporation, which requires that she see herself as bound up in the
corporation and so implicated in its acts. When and why should his liability to blame entail
his liability to punishment? Two conditions must each be met, and where they are met,
criminal liability is appropriate.
First, there must be a genuine crime of the corporation. Much of the consternation
about holding group members responsible for crimes of their fellows arises-rightly, in my
mind-because mere shared membership in a group does not suffice to ground shared
130. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 53 (1986).
13 1. See generally Sepinwall, supra note 60 (1 trace the evolution of the doctrine in federal and state law,
and argue that, in deviating from the doctrine's strict liability foundations, these more recent decisions undercut
the doctrine's defensibility.).
132. This two-track scheme is suggested in Park, 421 U.S. at 673 (stating that "the Act, in its criminalaspect,
does not require that which is objectively impossible. The theory upon which responsible corporate agents are
held criminally accountable for 'causing' violations of the Act permits a claim that a defendant was 'powerless'
to prevent or correct the violation to 'be raised defensively at a trial on the merits."') (emphasis added).
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responsibility. Instead, shared responsibility follows only from an act of the group as a
whole; it does not and was never intended to license transmission of responsibility from
the perpetrator of a wrong to some other individual simply because both happen to be
members of the same group. 133 To be sure, determining when and why we may ascribe
some employee's criminal act to the corporation is an exceedingly complicated task, and I
do not seek to articulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for doing so here. 134
Nonetheless, there are clear cases. Widespread fraud within a bank implicating employees
at the highest levels of the corporation would seem to be a particularly relevant example.
Assuming we do have on our hands a crime that is plausibly and appropriately
considered to be that of the corporation, when and why may we punish the faultless
executive? The answer to that question turns on a second condition-viz., that some
threshold level of commitment to the corporation be met in order to activate criminal
liability. Recall that the magnitude of the executive's shared responsibility will be
determined by the egregiousness of the corporate crime as well as the strength of her
expected commitment. I assume that a non-negligible commitment is expected of any
executive who holds her position in more than name only, and so blame for the
corporation's criminal acts may be assigned to her. But the strength of commitment
necessary for blame may well be less than the strength of commitment necessary for
criminal liability, especially if the corporate crime is not one that has produced substantial
harm. Given the stigma of criminal liability, we should require that the amount of
warranted blame exceed some baseline before subjecting the blamed executive to
prosecution and punishment. It would be difficult to state with any precision just where
this baseline is, but the difficulty is not unique to the account of responsibility I advance
here. Every society needs to determine for itself how blameworthy an actor must be to
render her justly subject to criminal law. Once we have a general sense of the minimal level
of blameworthiness required for criminal liability, we may compare the corporate officer's
blameworthiness to that of others we think deserving of punishment; where the corporate
officer's liability to blame is at least as great as theirs, prosecution and punishment will be
warranted. This is just how we proceed anytime we have occasion to ask whether it would
be just to criminalize some species of conduct. 135
Of course, one might contend that no matter the magnitude of the harm caused by the
133. This is the nightmare scenario that those who deem shared responsibility barbaric seem to have in mind,
but it is not the scenario that most defenders of shared responsibility contemplate.
134. Others have sought to do so, with more or less success. For an excellent account on this score, see
generally, WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS (2006) (examining the relationship
between an employee's criminal act and a corporation's liability for that act).
135. The fact that I resist our fixing the level of blame absolutely and instead urge our proceeding
comparatively is compatible with the way we typically manage judgments of relative blame and warranted
sanction. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91
MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1867-73, 1883-87 (2007) (examining the results of studies wherein participants assigned
liability for certain offenses). Moreover, this way of proceeding bears some resemblance to the Dotterweich
Court's refusal to fix in advance the set of corporate officers who might be held liable under the RCO, leaving
this determination instead to the discretion of prosecutors and judges. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277, 285 (1943) ("It would be too treacherous to define or even to indicate by way of illustration the class of
employees which stands in such a responsible relation. To attempt a formula embracing the variety of conduct
whereby persons may responsibly contribute in furthering a transaction forbidden by an Act of Congress, to wit,
to send illicit goods across state lines, would be mischievous futility. In such matters the good sense of
prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment ofjuries must be trusted.").
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corporation's crime, the executive's commitment will never be strong enough to make
criminal liability appropriate. Put differently, given that blameworthiness here turns not on
the executive's culpable contribution to the crime but instead on his commitment to the
corporation, one might argue that to heap punitive sanctions on top of whatever reproach
we might think appropriate far exceeds the treatment the executive deserves.
Two quick points in response to this worry. First, I argued in Part IV that the executive
has reason to accept blame, because his doing so is part and parcel of what makes
membership in a group like the corporation valuable. And I argue further that we have
reason to impose blame because doing so is the appropriate way to acknowledge the value
in these relationships. The criminal law can be but another way of affirming and so
promoting this value, and a uniquely powerful one at that. To be sure, when one thinks of
the traditional reasons for which we punish, we do not do so to affirm relationships we
value. Even the standard expressivist theory of criminal law sees punishment as a way of
restoring the victim's moral status, or as a way of debasing the defendant whose offense
would otherwise signal his superiority relative to the victim. 136 Expressivists do not
typically see punishment as a way of recognizing valuable relationships more generally.
At the same time, there is no other branch of law that speaks as compellingly to and for our
values as the criminal law does. To the extent one persists in doubting that criminal law
should speak here, I suspect that one objects not to criminal liability for the faultless
executive per se but instead to the sanctions one imagines that liability will entail.
This brings us to the second response: I agree that it would be unjust to impose upon
the executive convicted under the RCO doctrine the sanctions that typically accompany a
guilty verdict. For that reason, the sanctions I propose lack most, if not all, of the material
penalties that traditional sanctions involve.
B. Punishing Responsible Corporate Officers
Commentators have predicted, 137 and regulators have called for, 138 an increase in
RCO prosecutions. In light of the financial meltdown, this could be seen as a welcome
development. But we should celebrate it only if RCO liability is itself defensible, and only
if the sanctions it occasions appropriately conform to the magnitude and kind of
responsibility it tracks. The foregoing has sought to establish that it is at least sometimes
appropriate to prosecute executives who did not culpably contribute to their corporation's
crime. Here, I sketch the kinds of sanctions that might accompany a guilty verdict.
Most simply, the conviction itself, along with its attendant stigma, might suffice. In
136. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1508 (2000) (describing expressivism); Jeffrie C. Murphy, Forgiveness
and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 25 (Jeffrie C. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988); see also Jean
Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 128 (1988) (explaining how
punishment equalizes a victim's moral status by inflicting on the culprit treatment as bad as that which the victim
sustained).
137. Brian Stimson & Kimyatta McClary, "Responsible Corporate Officer": Business Executives Face
Strict Liability Under Novel Criminal Law Doctrine, 25 WLF LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 1, 1 (2010),
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/4-9-2OStimson-LegalBackgrounder.pdf.
138. Letter from Margaret Hamburg, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, to Sen. Charles E. Grassley,
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Finance (Mar. 4, 2010), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2010/20prg0304 1 Ob.pdf.
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this instance, RCO liability is not very different from those cases where it is the corporation
that is prosecuted and the corporate executive is made to sit at the defendant's table and to
stand so as to receive the judge's or jury's verdict. 139 However, whereas the executive in
the corporate criminal trial is a human stand-in for the disembodied corporation-its public
face, as it were-the executive on the account here is herself the target of warranted blame
in light of her own role within the corporation.
Let us set bare conviction with no attendant material sanctions as the baseline. 140
Three factors determine when upward departures from the baseline are warranted. Recall
that the baseline applies to those executives who are expected to harbor a commitment to
the corporation sufficiently great to subject them to criminal liability. 14 1 There may be
some members of the corporation who are expected to harbor a greater commitment still.
For example, the baseline might be satisfied by a mid-level manager but greatly exceeded
by the corporation's CEO, and the difference might be due entirely to their differing rungs
on the corporate ladder. This brings us to the first basis for an upward departure: We may
impose harsher sanctions where the expected commitment to the corporation is greater than
what the baseline contemplates with the severity of the enhanced sanctions varying in
relation to the enhanced strength of commitment (i.e., a slightly stronger expected
commitment will yield slightly stronger sanctions, while a significantly stronger expected
commitment will yield significantly stronger sanctions). The second basis will arise where
the executive's felt commitment is greater than that which the corporation expects of her.
These two bases of enhancement follow from the comments above about the way in which
the ground of the executive's responsibility will inform its magnitude. The third basis
corresponds to the nature of the crime, which is the object of the executive's responsibility.
Thus, where executives at two different transgressing companies are expected to harbor,
and do harbor, commitments of roughly the same strength, but the first company's violation
has caused much more harm than the second, it will be appropriate to punish the executive
at the first company more harshly than the executive at the second.
Importantly, though, the absolute scale will be quite narrow as compared with the
scale for individual guilt, and its uppermost point-its most severe sanction-must respect
and reflect the ground of responsibility under the RCO doctrine. Given that commitment
to a corporation is not itself opprobrious, it would be unfair for the RCO doctrine to result
in sanctions whose severity exceeded some agreed upon upper limit. For the moment, let
us stipulate that this uppermost limit includes (i) entry of guilty verdict, and (ii)
139. Jayne Barnard advocates for the CEO's presence at the sentencing of the corporation that has been
found criminally liable. Jayne Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CALIF. L. REv.
959, 963 (1999); see also Morton Mintz, A Crime Against Women: A.H. Robins and the Dalkon Shield, 7
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (1986) (describing the courtroom scene in the case against A.H. Robins for
knowingly distributing an intrauterine device that posed an undisclosed risk of morbidity and mortality, and that
did in fact cause miscarriages and death in some of the women who used it. At the close of the trial, the presiding
judge ordered the CEO, general counsel and a senior corporate executive of A.H. Robins-none of whom had
been sued individually-to appear in his courtroom, where he proceeded to sear them for their greed and shocking
indifference.).
140. Cf. Stephen P. Garvey, Authority, Ignorance and the Guilty Mind 35 (Cornell Law School Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, No. 14-20, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2443864 (identifying conviction with no attendant
punishment as a possible response to crimes committed through willful ignorance of the law).
141. See note 135 and accompanying text.
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disgorgement of all incentive-based pay for the period in which the offense occurred to a
victim restitution fund, and (iii) a public letter of apology to be printed in those news
sources most likely to be read by the victim community. Convictions in cases involving
less blame than those that would occasion this maximum penalty-cases in which the
object of responsibility was less dire and/or the expected commitment less strong-would
involve a correspondingly smaller financial penalty, might forego the mandated apology,
or they might impose a creative, non-financial penalty-the harshness of which was agreed
to correspond to the relative blameworthiness of the convicted executive. Indeed, given the
compressed scale, creativity in crafting sanctions will be at a premium to produce
sufficiently fine-grained distinctions that make clear the defendant's relative
blameworthiness. All of that by way of a very rough outline.
One might wonder why the object of responsibility should have any role to play in
setting the severity of the sanction. We might instead treat the offense as a kind of binary
switch: So long as the corporation has committed an offense, any executive with a
commitment to the corporation of sufficient strength would be targeted for prosecution; we
would then vary the severity of the sanction solely in light of differences in the strength of
the convicted executive's commitment. In this way, given executives at two different
transgressing companies whose positions demand similar levels of commitment, we would
impose upon each punishments of equal severity even if the first corporation's offense
involved far less harm than the second's. To see how this would work in practice, consider
the following example. In a callous bid for profits, corporation A and corporation B both
fail to disclose the full range of risks of the financial products they are peddling. The
probability of the undisclosed risks is the same for A and B, but the loss that the counter-
party would sustain if the risks were to materialize is far greater for B's financial product
than A's. Suppose now that the undisclosed risks do materialize in both A and B. An
account that had the executive's sanctions turn only on the ground of her
blameworthiness-for example, the strength of her expected commitment-would have an
executive at A and an executive at B incur sanctions of the same severity, assuming that
each bears the same strength of commitment to her respective corporation. If this result
seems troubling-if we intuitively feel that the executive at B should suffer a greater
punishment than the executive at A-we might find support for the intuition in the
perspective that the victims of each corporation's offense should adopt. Presumably, the
investors who lost the full amount of their investment would be warranted in harboring
more resentment toward the officers at the second corporation than the first. If criminal
law's response to an offender is to track the amount of resentment warranted on the part of
the victim of the offense, then it makes sense to punish the executive at the second
corporation more harshly than we punish the executive at the first. Again, however, the
maximum penalty is cabined by the nature of the relationship of any of these executives to
the crime.
C. When Should We Impose Criminal Liability on Corporate Officers?
To round out the account, it will be useful to articulate the scope of liability that I
believe it licenses. First, and most familiarly by now, the account dispenses with individual
fault as a prerequisite for blame and hence criminal liability. Executives who are
legitimately subject to prosecution on my account need not have culpably omitted to fulfill
some duty as a result of which the corporation's criminal violation occurred. Put
[Vol. 40:2
Crossing the Fault Line in Corporate Criminal Law
differently, the account licenses prosecution of even those executives who could, under the
doctrine's current operation, avail themselves of an impossibility defense. Thus, the
corporate executive may be prosecuted even if it would have been impossible-practically
or physically-for her to prevent the corporation's offense. Because her blameworthiness
derives from her commitment to the corporation, and not her culpable contribution to the
offense, it makes no difference that she could not have prevented the offense even if she
had sought to do so. Of course, nothing in the account would foreclose our assigning even
more blame to, and imposing more severe sanctions upon, the executive who could
reasonably have prevented some offense and yet failed to do so.
Second, because the ground of responsibility on my account is, again, the executive's
expected commitment to the corporation, the account does not privilege health and welfare
offenses in the way that the traditional RCO doctrine does. 142 Instead, no principled reason
exists to refrain from extending RCO liability, on my account, to any kind of corporate
criminal offense. In particular, once we have decided that a particular activity portends
sufficient harm to warrant its criminalization, then the executive shares responsibility for
the activity's occurrence and may, on the basis of the account advanced here, be held
criminally liable for it, at least assuming a sufficiently strong expected commitment.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the account licenses prosecution and
punishment of executives who, at the time of the crime's commission, were not expected
to harbor any commitment to the corporation-indeed, they need not even have been in its
employ at the time when the crime occurred. Again, the executive's blameworthiness turns
not on her having proximately caused the corporation's crime but instead on the obligations
she faces to stand alongside her fellows when the corporation is called to account. Thus,
the diachronic case (i.e., the case where the corporation committed a crime at time T1, and
it is judged at some later time T2, and the executive joined the corporation after Tl but
before T2) appears not to differ, in a morally relevant way, from the garden-variety case of
a crime that did occur during the executive's tenure in the corporation but in which she did
not participate. The intuition that matters are different rests upon the faulty notion that
executives have some control over the acts their corporation undertakes during their
tenure-but not those it undertakes before-and it is this control that really grounds the
executives' responsibility. But I have been contending that executives may bear
responsibility for their corporation's act even if there was no possibility that they could
have prevented the act's commission. That prevention was made impossible by (1) the fact
that the person who now holds the executive's office didn't even belong to the corporation
at the time the crime was committed rather than (2) some more mundane fact (e.g., the
executive was denied knowledge that the crime was to occur) seems to be without moral
import. This is so at least in part because responsibility rests on the executive's
commitment, and no reason exists to think that the commitment applies with lesser force
between senior and junior members (i.e., those who belonged to the corporation at the time
of the crime's commission and those who joined subsequently) than between members of
roughly the same vintage. The corporation is the same corporation, and the joint project is
142. But cf Tyler O'Connor, Prosecuting Executives for Financial Fraud: The Responsible Corporate
Officer Doctrine as an Alternative Means of Criminal Liability, 6-7 (Apr. 1, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=2243124 (noting that the RCO doctrine is used to implicate
executives at pharmaceutical companies but not those at investment firms whose misconduct has caused millions
of dollars in losses).
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the same joint project. The normative pressure on executives to stand with their fellows is
no less compelling for the diachronic case than the synchronic one.
VII. CONCLUSION
When we disentangle the elements of a responsibility assignment, we see that there is
nothing mysterious, let alone perverse or barbaric, about assigning responsibility for a
corporate crime to a corporate officer who did not participate in that crime. The corporate
officer incurs responsibility as a result of her commitment to the corporation, and the
magnitude of her responsibility will vary according to the greater of the corporation's
expected level of commitment or her felt commitment. Moreover, her responsibility might
appropriately occasion criminal liability, with sanctions tailored to the magnitude of her
blameworthiness.
The corporation is a joint project par excellence. A narrow, individualist account is
unduly constraining when it comes to assigning responsibility for the corporation's
transgressions. Instead, we need an understanding of responsibility expansive enough to
track the blame that arises in light of one's relationship to the group and independent of
one's contribution to the wrong. We need a legal apparatus that gives a state-sanctioned
voice to the varieties of reproach we are licensed in issuing to executives whose
corporations commit crimes. We need to acknowledge that there can be culpability without
fault and through commitment alone.
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